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1 General Introduction 
Choice behavior and the nature of sound judgment have occupied several scientific fields for 
centuries. With the availability of neuroscientific methods, a new research direction emerged 
with the aim of verifying and expanding existing knowledge by adding a biological perspective. 
Neuroeconomics is one of these interdisciplinary fields that combines neuroscience with the 
major disciplines that have dealt so far with the question of how people make decisions or how 
decisions should be made (for a review see Camerer et al., 2005). With the aim to obtain a more 
complete model of decision behavior, neuroeconomics draws upon current theories, models, 
methods, and issues in the field of psychology, economics, and neuroscience. As the name 
indicates, economics was the driving force in this development. It was a major concern of 
scientists in this field to find neural correlates of the parameters predictive of choice behavior in 
the economic domain, not only to validate mathematical models of choice behavior. Though, 
one might assume that economic models do not need to include neural details to specify more 
accurate models of decision making, one has to take into account that decision making is not 
the product of one single observable process. Instead it reflects the interaction of specialized 
presumable cortical systems. Using brain-imaging techniques helps to specify the interaction of 
these different determinants. However, in addition to neuroeconomics yet another field has 
emerged making use of neuroscientific methods. This new field, decision neuroscience, evolved 
in order to gain a better understanding of decision behavior (Shiv et al., 2005). There are many 
overlaps between these two fields and terms are often used interchangeably (Smith and 
Huettel, 2010). Nevertheless, considerable efforts in the field of decision neuroscience are 
directed to the processes that underlie decision making and judgment.  
Although the following work can be incorporated into these two areas, the focus will be on 
neuroeconomics, since findings in this area have led to the research question elaborated in the 
present work. Therefore, prior to the presentation of the two main articles published as a result 
of this thesis, a short introduction in neoclassical economics and social preferences will be given, 
followed by related neuroscientific findings. Since most behavioral economic studies and 
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theories are based on game theoretic paradigms, a description of the games named here can be 
found in the appendix.  
 
2 Economic Models of Social Preferences 
As already mentioned in the beginning, neuroeconomics has its roots or is strongly connected to 
the field of behavioral economics. Behavioral economics incorporates psychological principles to 
explain why humans deviate from the rational-agent model as postulated by neoclassic 
economic and seeks to improve these models of decision behavior using evidence and ideas 
from neuroscience. 
 
2.1 Neoclassical economics 
Neoclassical economics formulates descriptive respectively predictive theories to describe 
human behavior in the economic system using mathematical techniques. Most of these models 
are based on psychological concepts and aim at inferring subjective value or preferences. For 
instance, one well known theorem is the expected utility theory postulated by von Neumann 
and Morgenstern (1944). The expected utility theory states that individuals choose between 
uncertain outcomes solely based on the utility value of each outcome multiplied by the 
probability of each outcome. The resulting utility function describes how individuals will rank 
each option. Obtained data or revealed preference data are than further used to calibrate the 
utility model to predict future behavior. Generally, neoclassic models are based on the 
assumption that human behavior follows a rational principle, e.g. if prices increase, 
consumption decrease, determined by desire and belief with the aim of maximizing utility. 
Furthermore, it is assumed that social processes and group phenomena can be explained by the 
individual rationality respectively the individual behavior as defined above. Furthermore, 
behavior in groups is expected to represent an equilibrium, which means behavior of each 
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individual does not change as long as the environment does not change (for review see e.g. 
Brennan and Moehler, 2010).  
One core problem of this axiomatic approach is that it hardly ever predicts behavior in natural 
environments correctly and that there are several phenomena that falsify the beforehand 
presented axioms. 
A well-known experiment showing that the self-interest hypothesis, which assumes that the 
own material payoff is the sole motivation of all people, cannot account for human behavior, is 
the so called ultimatum game. In this game a proposer has to split a sum of money between 
himself and the responder. After the proposer has made his offer, the responder has to decide 
whether to accept or reject this offer. If the responder accepts the offer the money is 
distributed accordingly, if the responder rejects the offer both receive nothing. Assuming that 
both players behave rationally and do not care about the outcome of the other player, the 
responder would have to accept any positive outcome and the proposer would offer the 
smallest amount of money to the responder and keep the rest. In fact, most of the offers are 
about 40% - 50% of the total amount and offers below 20% are rejected with a probability of 
about 50% (Güth et al., 1982; Camerer, 1995). These results are very robust and have been 
often replicated; they even do not change with the size of the stake (Hoffman et al., 1996).  
This experimental evidence and other controlled experiments using psychological methods have 
proven the self-interest hypothesis per se wrong, since it cannot explain the observed behavior 
across different experiments. Therefore, it has been adjusted by the assumption that we do 
have other-regarding preference or social preferences, respectively. To be precise, humans are 
assumed to be motivated by self-interests. Yet, concerns for the well-being of others, for 
fairness and for reciprocity cannot be ignored in social interactions and have to be included as 
parameters predictive of choice behavior (Fehr and Schmidt, 2006). Important models of 
economic decision making that allow good predictions concerning these game theoretic 
paradigms, will be presented in the next section. 
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2.2 Intention based Reciprocity 
Matthew Rabin (1993) formulated a model based on the assumption that people are kind to 
other kind people, whereas they behave unfair towards those who behave unfair as well. 
Therefore, people sacrifice their own material payoff to help those who are kind and to punish 
those being unkind.  
The most important fact about his model is that it is in line with the concept of “psychological 
game theory” developed by Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti (1989) where payoffs are a 
function of the players´ beliefs and their action. When player i chooses his strategy he must 
have some beliefs about the strategy the other player will choose. For that reason player´s 
subjective expected utility depends on the strategy of the player, his beliefs about the other 
players’ strategy, and his beliefs about the other players’ beliefs concerning the strategy he will 
choose. At a first step Rabin mentioned the “kindness function” which measures how kind 
player i is towards player j. It is a function of the strategy chosen by player i in consequence of 
the beliefs he has about the strategy player j will choose. Kindness is measured by the 
difference between the actual payoff j will get and the equitable payoff in relation to the worst 
and the best possible outcome. If i treats player j fair, ƒi(ai,bj) = 0. If it is greater than zero, player 
i is giving him more than the equitable payoff and if it is less than zero he is giving him less than 
the equitable payoff. In a second step it is necessary to define player i´s beliefs about how kindly 
j is treating him, as a function of the second order beliefs and the first order beliefs concerning 
the action of player j. This utility function ensures that if player j treats i unfair player i´s utility is 
always smaller than the material utility. On the other hand i gets some additional utility from 
being kind to j when j is perceived to be kind as well. If the payoffs are high the kindness term 
becomes less important. Otherwise, if the material payoffs are small social concerns take over. 
One major problem of Rabin´s model is that it can only account for two-person games with 
complete information. Attempts to manage n-person games will be described in the next part. 
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2.3 Inequity aversion 
The model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) as well as the model by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) 
assume that the players’ utility not only depends on the players’ own material payoff, but may 
also depend on the payoff of the other players. Before going into detail concerning differences 
and similarities between these two models, a short description of both models will be given. 
 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999): A theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) assume that there are individuals who dislike inequity. They feel 
inequity if they are worse off or better off in material terms than the other players. And they 
suffer more if inequity is to their disadvantage compared to situations where they gain an 
advantage. Therefore, the utility loss from disadvantageous inequality is larger than the loss 
from advantageous inequality. The utility function reaches its maximum when the payoff of 
player i equals to the payoff of player j, at (xi = xj).  
 
  ( )        
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∑   {       } 
      
 
 
Since the loss in utility is larger for disadvantage inequality the weights of the two parts of the 
utility function have the following thresholds       and        thus, the subject is loss 
averse in social comparison. In the case       , the subject is indifferent between keeping one 
dollar and giving it away to his opponent. The smaller    becomes the more people like being 
better off than others. Negative    values are ruled out, since these would be associated with a 
higher utility (more than the actual payoff) when another person is worse off. Nevertheless, the 
authors do not preclude that there are people who have negative values here. Importantly, in 
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contrast to the model of Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), the player compares his payoff with the 
payoff of each other player. 
Similar to the model of Rabin (1993) this model can account for results in the ultimatum game. 
Additionally, it is able to explain findings in games with more than two players. One 
disadvantage of this linear difference aversion model is that results in the dictator game cannot 
be explained. Here the Fehr and Schmidt model would predict either very fair (s = 0,5) or very 
unfair (s = 0) offers. Yet, behavioural results show that most offers are in between the two 
extremes. A model that allows predicting offers in the dictator game will be described in the 
next part. 
 
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000): Theory of Equity, Reciprocity and Competition 
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) developed the so called ERC model (Equity, Reciprocity, and 
Competition). This model is based on the idea that people are motivated by the interaction of 
their own absolute (monetary) payoff from the experiment, as well as by their own relative 
payoff. Thus, it is assumed that players compare themselves only with the “average” player and 
do not care about the distribution of payoffs among other players. The aim of each player is to 
maximize the expected value of the motivation function (as described in the expected utility 
function): 
       (     ), 
where    is the absolute and    the relative payoff of player I, defined as 
      (      )   {
   ⁄             
  ⁄             
 
      ∑    
 
   
the total pecuniary payoff. 
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The ERC model allows for good predictions in the dictator and ultimatum game. Additionally, it 
predicts many of other phenomena observed in games with more than two players (Bolton and 
Ockenfels, 1997). However, this theory cannot explain, for example, punishment in the Third-
Party Punishment Game (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004), it would predict that players never invest 
money to punish unfair treatment of another player. In fact, roughly 60% of the players punish 
the allocator for the violation of cooperation norms: the lower the transfer the higher the 
punishment. Additionally, 70 - 80% of the players being treated unfair expected that the 
allocators will be punished for an unfair distribution. 
The major difference between these two models of inequity aversion is that they have a 
different notion about how to integrate the other players in the game. ERC assumes that people 
only compare themselves to the average player, whereas Fehr and Schmidt (1999) assume that 
the player compares his/her payoff with each and every other player´s payoff separately. For 
ERC this implies that there is no difference in utility function when some of the players are rich 
and others poor compared to all having the same as long as the own payoff is as close as 
possible to the average payoff. In the model by Fehr and Schmidt people are most happy in the 
last case, when all receive the same. Although, the model by Charness and Rabin, which will be 
described next, incorporates inequality aversion too, it is different in the sense that reciprocity, 
social-welfare and competition are also included. 
 
Charness and Rabin: Social Preferences 
Charness and Rabin (2002) developed a linear two person social preference model that is quite 
different to the models described before. Within this model it is possible to capture difference 
aversion, social welfare, competition, and reciprocity. It therefor incorporates three different 
parameters, two to capture distributional preferences and one to account for reciprocity. The 
weights for the three parameters change depending on the other player being ahead or behind 
and his/her behavior, i.e. whether the other player has misbehaved or not. Given that    and 
   are the money payoffs of two players, player A and player B, the utility of B (UB), whose 
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choice follows a move of player A, is thus given by the sum of the weighted payoffs of player A 
and B. Whereas, if A is better off s = 1 and r = 0, if B is better off s = 0 and r = 1; q equals to -1 if 
A has misbehaved and is zero otherwise. 
 
  (     )  (           )     (             )      
 
Using this function it is possible to incorporate three different types of distributional 
preferences by varying the weights σ and ρ, and reciprocity, given by the parameter θ. The three 
types of distributional preferences are represented as follows: 
1. Competitive preferences: if       ; B prefers that his payoff is equal to or higher 
than that of player A. Insofar it is related to the concept of inequity aversion; since B 
wants to reduce differences in payoff between himself and player A. 
2. Social-welfare preferences: if        ; B prefers to get more for himself and for 
A; B is more in favor to get more for himself if A is better off. 
3. Difference aversion:          B prefers equal payoffs and wants to lower A´s 
payoff if A does better. 
 
Charness and Rabin tested their model regarding empirical results in different two and three -
person bargaining games. Decisions in this games where made by either B, or both, A and B. The 
Dictator Game was used to isolate distributional preferences form reciprocity. By varying the 
weights according to the ranges given by the different distributional preferences mentioned 
above, they tried to find out which of these parameters can explain the given data best. They 
showed that most of the results can be explained by social-welfare preferences and even 
narrow self-interest. Across all the games investigated, B´s behavior was explained very little by 
differences aversion and competitive preferences. Concerning A´s predictions about the 
behavior of B, difference aversion was clearly to the fore. 
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2.4 Conclusion 
The neoclassical approach assumes that people are solely motivated by the material payoff they 
will get. Lots of empirical studies from various fields using different experimental setups suggest 
that results cannot be interpreted in terms of the self-interest hypothesis solely. Therefore, 
some other (intrinsic) motivational factors have to exist that let people behave fair in specific 
situations. All the models mentioned before provide ways to predict some of the observations 
made in for example the dictator, ultimatum, and market or prisoner´s dilemma games. Yet, all 
of them used a different approach. 
The model by Rabin (1993) representing a pioneer work in this field is the most different from 
the other three models. Most remarkable is the fact that intentions of the players are the 
source of reciprocal behavior. Thus, people receive reward and punishment according to either 
fair or unfair intentions. Also concerns for equity are incorporated in respect of the intentions of 
the players. In that sense people have unfair intentions when they perceive to get less money 
than others. An important aspect of this model is that the subjective utility is always smaller 
than the actual material utility if the player is treated unfair by the other.  
The major problem of Rabin´s model is that it can only be applied to two-person games with 
complete information. Whereas, the approach used by the other three models also accounts for 
n-player games. 
The differences and similarities of the two difference aversion models by Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (ERC; 2000) have already been outlined above. To sum up, 
both approaches assume that people are motivated to reduce the difference between their own 
payoff and the payoff of other players. ERC posits that individuals compare their payoff with the 
average payoff of all other players, for example in case of three players, one is satisfied as long 
as he/she gets one third of the total amount. Fehr and Schmidt (1999), on the other side, 
assume that the players compare their payoff with the payoff of each and every other payoff 
and thus, one is only satisfied if everyone gets one third of the total amount. Rabin and 
Charness (2002) compared different distributional preference in regard to results in the 
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ultimatum game and dictator game and their possible variations. In contrast to the models 
based on the assumption that people are difference averse, they found that people are not 
mainly motivated by reducing the differences between payoffs. According to them it seems to 
be more important to increase the payoff for all subjects and especially for those who have a 
very low payoff. For example, if one player has the possibility to choose between (800,200) and 
(0,0), everyone will choose the first allocation. This decision is not in line with the difference 
aversion hypothesis. When subjects are asked to choose between (400,400) or (700,400), with 
700 representing the amount the other player will receive, 69% choose the second allocation. 
These results show that individuals do not care that heavily about the differences in payoff, but 
do care for the total surplus. To conclude, following Fehr and Schmidt (2006), one major 
problem concerning the prediction of behavior in games with more than two players is that it is 
still unclear who the relevant players are that one refers to or in other words whose payoff is 
taken into account when deciding. 
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3 Social preferences: From a biological point of view 
As outlined above, the main objective of economics is to predict decision behavior of individuals 
based on the preferences an individual has about consumptions; thus, neuroeconomics tries to 
answer how these preferences are generated in the brain. Early studies, focused on the 
processing of gains and losses (Delgado et al., 2000; Bush et al., 2002; Gehring and Willoughby, 
2002) as well as on the anticipation and reception of monetary reward (Knutson et al., 2000; 
Breiter et al., 2001), identified several regions in the brain that are associated with the 
representation of value and correlate with expressed preferences. This highly interconnected 
network includes brain regions like the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), the striatum, the amygdala, 
and the dopaminergic midbrain (for review see O'Doherty, 2004; Grabenhorst and Rolls, 2011). 
Compelling evidence supports the notion that the OFC is involved in the representation of 
reward and the formation of preferences. For instance, activation in the OFC changes for a given 
food stimulus dependent on the satiety state of the individual. Neurons in the OFC decrease 
their response from pre- to post-satiety for a given food stimulus, whereas these neurons show 
no decrease when the food has not been eaten to satiety (Small et al., 2001; Kringelbach et al., 
2003). Besides encoding the reward value of a food stimuli (O'Doherty et al., 2001b), the OFC is 
responsible for representing the reward value of a variety of stimuli, e.g., olfactory (Gottfried et 
al., 2002; Rolls et al., 2003a), somatosensory (Rolls et al., 2003b), visual (Aharon et al., 2001), 
auditory (Blood et al., 1999) and monetary stimuli (Elliott et al., 2003). Furthermore, the 
magnitude of activation changes in relation to the amounts of reward (Elliott et al., 2003) and 
punishment (O'Doherty et al., 2001a) and plays an critical role in goal directed behavior 
(Plassmann et al., 2007; Hare et al., 2008). Though it has been shown that ventral striatum is 
related to preferences concerning different consumer products (Knutson et al., 2007), most 
studies suggest that this region is central in reward prediction (Schultz et al., 1997) and in 
coding of stimulus salience even irrespective of reward value (Zink et al., 2003; 2006). The 
amygdala, which was extensively studied in relation to the processing of aversive events 
(Adolphs et al., 1995; 1998), plays also a key role in the representation of reward (Bechara et al., 
1999). Wherein, the amygdala is supposed to be particularly involved in the learning of 
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stimulus-value associations and in the processing of stimulus intensity (for a review see Baxter 
and Murray, 2002). 
These insights gained from studying the neural correlates of reward processing formed the basis 
for studies investigating reward processing in the social context drawing on paradigms from 
behavioral economics. For instance, it has been observed that cooperation (Decety et al., 2004; 
Tabibnia et al., 2008), altruism (Moll et al., 2006; Izuma et al., 2009), and reciprocity (Rilling et 
al., 2004; Phan et al., 2010) were associated with the very same regions in the brain. Thus, these 
social phenomena may have a positive hedonic value per se and may thereby motivate prosocial 
behavior.  
 
 
 
Figure 1| adapted from Sanfey et al. (2007); Core regions implicated in social decision-making. 
 
 
However, although people do have social preferences, there are selfish motives which have a 
decisive influence on our decisions. Thus, the question arose how these competing motives – 
self-interest versus other-related preferences – are processed in the brain. 
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3.1 Neural evidence of inequity aversion  
Fliessbach and colleagues (2007) studied the impact of social comparison (Festinger, 1954) on 
activity in the ventral striatum, as mentioned before, a core region implicated in the 
representation of the subjective value of primary and secondary incentives. Consistent with the 
assumption that humans are inequality avers activity in ventral striatum was reduced whenever 
participants received less than their counterpart. Furthermore, people who are more concerned 
about social values exhibit enhanced amygdala activation and feel more unpleasant in response 
to unequal payoffs (Haruno and Frith, 2010).  
Since Fliessbach and colleagues (2007) solely studied disadvantageous inequality, Tricomi and 
colleagues (2010) applied a different paradigm making it possible to study both–advantageous 
and disadvantageous inequality. Participants who were at the outset better off in material 
terms showed reduced activity in ventral striatum when money was transferred to themselves 
compared to conditions, where money was transferred to the disadvantaged counterpart. In a 
follow-up study by Fliessbach and colleagues (2012) subjects were scanned simultaneously 
using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while they were performing a task where 
they could earn money following correct responses. When both subjects gave an incorrect 
response, they received nothing. A correct response of just one participant yielded a reward for 
those who provided the correct answer, whereas the other received nothing. If both subjects 
gave the correct answer, both received either the same amount of money, or one received 
either more than the other or less. Activity in the ventral striatum was reduced when 
participants received less than their counterpart, but in contrast to the study by Tricomi and 
colleagues no such decrease could be observed when the other received less. Thus, the 
subjective value of a reward as represented in the striatum depends on what others receive.  
In summary, these studies support the notion that humans compare their payoff with the payoff 
of relevant others. However, the degree of inequality aversion seems to be related to the 
reasons for these differences in payoffs.   
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3.2 Neural correlates of fairness 
Recent neuroimaging studies have shown that unfair treatment is related to an increased 
activation of the anterior insula and the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; King-Casas et al., 
2008; Takagishi et al., 2009; Guroglu et al., 2010). For instance, unfair proposals in bargaining 
games are related to increases in insula activation and correlate with the subsequent 
punishment of the proposer (Sanfey et al., 2003). Interestingly, activity in the left anterior insula 
is related not only to punishment with respect to unfair treatment of oneself, even when 
decisions are made for someone else punishment of the unfair counterpart is associated with 
higher activation in the anterior insula. However, activation in medial prefrontal cortex is solely 
involved in self-related processing of unfair offers (Corradi-Dell'acqua et al., 2012). Furthermore, 
Güroğlu and colleagues (2011) found that the relation between activity in the anterior insula 
and dorsal ACC is highly dependent on the intentions of the proposers. The same holds for 
subsequent decisions in these games. Using a different approach, the trust game, King-Casas 
and colleagues (2008) found activation of the anterior insula in response to low offers made by 
the counterpart and a similar increase in activation in the anterior insula when participants 
themselves sent back small offers. These findings illustrate that anterior insula and dorsal ACC 
are highly involved in social interaction and give rise to the emotional reactions in response to 
unfair treatment; either made by oneself or someone else. 
Beside the anterior insula and dorsal ACC there are several other brain regions that play a 
crucial role in social interactions. For instance, a low-frequent repetitive transcranial magnetic 
stimulation study (Knoch et al., 2006) showed that diminishing the activation of the right 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), led to a decrease in tendencies to punish unfair 
behavior, although, offers were viewed as unfair. Furthermore, the rejection rate of offers made 
by a computer showed no difference. The authors suggest that the DLPFC decreases self-
interested impulses and thus enables subjects to implement their fairness goals. 
Using pharmacological intervention a recent study found activation in amygdala in relation to 
processing of inequality (Gospic et al., 2011). Treatment with Benzodiazepine led to a reduction 
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in punishment behavior accompanied by a reduced activation of the amygdala. The control 
group showed strong activation in the amygdala in accordance with the behavioral response. 
Activations in the anterior insula and the DLPFC were comparable in these two groups. Thus, 
Gospic et al. (2011) assume that the negative affect associated with being treated unfair is 
mainly driven by amygdala responses and this in turn seems to modulate activity in the ACC and 
the medial prefrontal cortex.  
Taken together, activation bilaterally in the anterior insula, the ACC, and the DLPFC are 
consistently reported following the processing of unfair compared to fair offers. These 
activations were stronger when receiving unfair offers from a human partner compared to a 
computer partner. Additionally, unfair offers that had been rejected showed stronger activation 
in the anterior insula, which was associated with the emotional processing. On the other hand, 
subjects who accepted low offers showed an increased activation in the DLPFC, commonly 
associated with executive functions and the manipulation and maintenance of information in 
working memory  (D'Esposito et al., 1995; Prabhakaran et al., 2000). Sanfey and colleagues 
(2003) proposed that activation in the anterior insula and DLPFC represents the interaction 
between the emotional goal (reject) and the cognitive rational goal (accept). Since, the ACC is, 
inter alia, known to be involved when cognitive conflicts do occur (Carter et al., 1999; Botvinick 
et al., 2001) and is not related to actual behavior in the ultimatum game, the authors assumed 
that it may reflect a conflict between emotions and cognition. However, electrophysiological 
studies suggest that ACC is more likely related to violation of expectations and thus, might 
reflect the violation of social expectations.  
 
3.3 Reward prediction error and social expectations 
Recent electrophysiological studies consistently report a negative deflection in the ongoing 
electroencephalogram (EEG) that is more pronounced following unfair compared to fair offers. 
Since, it reaches its maximum at about 250 to 300 ms after the offer presentation over fronto-
central electrode sites it is interpreted in terms of the medial frontal negativity (MFN). The MFN 
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was first described by Gehring and Willoughby (2002) as a negative-going wave form 265ms 
after feedback onset. Overall, the MFN is more pronounced, i.e., more negative going, following 
losses than gains. Dipole source modelling suggested a generator in the ACC. Since, the MFN 
observed in the study by Gehring and Willoughby was independent from performance feedback 
given simultaneously to the gain/loss feedback the authors concluded that this component 
cannot be equated with a previously described component called the feedback-related 
negativity (FRN; Miltner et al., 1997). The FRN, which is related to negative performance 
feedback and the corresponding error-related negativity (ERN; Gehring et al., 1993; 1995), 
which is related to the erroneous responses itself, are both assumed to be generated in the ACC 
too (Dehaene et al., 1994; Bellebaum and Daum, 2008). Since, the MFN seen after loss feedback 
bears a resemblance with the FRN that can be observed after negative performance feedback in 
topography, latency, and underlying neural generator, the question arose whether these two 
components might reflect the same process. Therefore, Nieuwenhuis and colleagues (2004b) 
repeated the Gehring and Willoughby (2002) experiment, but changed the salience of the 
feedback qualities. In line with the assumption that both components represent the same 
neural process, the EEG component observed distinguished between negative and positive 
feedback, when performance (correct/incorrect) over utility (gain/loss) was emphasized. 
Contrary, when utility was more salient than performance the very same component 
distinguished between gains and losses (see Figure 2). 
Since then, several studies had been conducted using various paradigms that broadened our 
knowledge concerning this early event-related potential (ERP) component associated with the 
monitoring and evaluation of ongoing events. For instance, negative feedback as well as neutral 
feedback elicits a MFN that is more pronounced than following positive feedback (Holroyd et al., 
2006). Even small gains compared to high gains were found to be associated with MFN 
amplitudes similar to those observed after losses (Bellebaum et al., 2010). Furthermore, no 
overt response is required to observe an MFN; even passive viewing in a slot-machine task 
yields to a MFN more pronounced following losses compared to gains (Donkers et al., 2005). 
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Figure 2| adapted from Nieuwenhuis et al. (2004); Top: ERP waveforms at electrode Fcz following feedback 
emphasising utility. As outlined in the text losses (indicated by a red line) are followed by a more negative going 
component with peak activity between 200 and 300ms than gains (indicated by a green line). Bottom: When 
performance is emphasised, within the very same time range an enhanced FRN can be observed following feedback 
indicating an incorrect response (dashed line) compared to feedback indicating a correct response (solid line). Right 
Panel: Scalp topography of MFN difference waves (blue indicates negative values and red indicates positive values). 
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There have been several attempts to formulate a unifying theory concerning these different 
mediofrontal ERPs. The most prevailing theory was proposed by Holroyd and Coles in 2002. In 
1997 Schultz and colleagues published their work on prediction and reward studying single 
midbrain dopamine neurons in the monkey brain while their test animals performed a task 
receiving reward for accurate responses (for a review see Schultz et al., 1997; 1999). Results 
were intriguing: dopamine neurons responded to reward as well as to novel events right after 
presentation with phasic activation. After several runs, when the monkey has learned the 
coherence between cue and reward, dopamine neurons responded already at the cue, whereas, 
the delivery of rewards itself no longer caused a phasic response. On trials where reward was 
omitted at the appropriate time, dopamine neurons decreased their firing rate below their basal 
firing rate (see Figure 3). Schultz and colleagues, concluded that dopamine neurons are sensitive 
to the “goodness” of ongoing events based on learned predictions about these events. Since, a 
positive signal is elicited when events exceeds expectations, no change in signal occurs when 
events are as predicted, and a negative signal can be observed if an event is worse than 
predicted.  
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 Similarities between the characteristics of the MFN, the functions associated with the ACC 
which is supposed to be the generator of the MFN, and findings regarding the midbrain 
dopamine system prompted Holroyd and Coles (2002) to postulate a unifying theory. According 
to this theory the midbrain dopamine system conveys a negative reinforcement learning signal 
to the ACC, disinhibiting the apical dendrites of motor neurons in ACC and leading to a negative 
deflection in the ongoing EEG.  
Investigations in subsequent years have confirmed the reinforcement theory as proposed by 
Holroyd and Coles in 2002 to some extent, but also provided new insides. To cut a long story 
short: The dorsal ACC or anterior medial cingulate cortex (aMCC; as suggested by Vogt et al., 
2003  based on cytology) is supposed to evaluate the necessity of a behavioral adaption. Thus, 
errors, novel events, tasks involving high conflict, and mismatches activate the ACC and exercise 
the N200 amplitude not necessarily related to the valence of an event, or reward in the 
narrower sense (Baker and Holroyd, 2011; Wessel et al., 2012). Given that, the MFN 
distinguishes between events better or worse than expected, similar to the dopaminergic 
activity outlined before, it is assumed that, though sharing morphological properties, they are 
distinct from each other. The temporal overlap between N200 and MFN further suggests that 
the N200 might be suppressed following unpredicted rewards (Baker and Holroyd, 2011). This 
view is supported by studies investigating these two components using EEG in conjunction with 
imaging methods. While both activate the ACC, only the MFN, but not the N200, is related to 
activity in the ventral striatum (Martin et al., 2009; Carlson et al., 2011). 
Taken together it is assumed that the MFN distinguishes events on an abstract good-bad 
dimension (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004a) or in other words indicates whether a goal has been 
achieved or not (Hajcak et al., 2006). This is achieved by taking into account prior knowledge or 
available alternatives to adapt to a changing environment and facilitate future behavior. 
Whereas, positive and negative reward prediction errors determine the amplitude of the MFN, 
unpredicted positive events decrease the amplitude and negative events increase the 
amplitude. As will be described in detail in the following articles, several EEG studies found 
differences in MFN amplitudes in the context of the ultimatum game.  Most of them reported 
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higher – more negative-going–MFN amplitude values after unfair compared to fair offers (e.g., 
Boksem and De Cremer, 2010; Hewig et al., 2011). In light of the assumptions concerning the 
appearance of the MFN this might suggest that in the social context rather the expectations 
regarding other people´s behavior and not merely reward and punishment itself influence the 
amplitude of the MFN. 
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4 Research Question – Aim of the Project 
The aim of the present project was to elucidate to what extent social preferences like inequality 
aversion, altruism, or spite affect early neuronal processing using EEG and the three-person 
ultimatum game as a tool. As such, this project is in part a replication of recent neuroscientific 
studies using the ultimatum game mentioned above. In contrast to previous studies, however, 
here a “three person ultimatum game” was used to gain additional information about how an 
unfair offer towards a third person is processed in the brain.  
The three-person ultimatum game is a mixture of the regular ultimatum game and the so called 
dictator game. Compared to the regular two-person ultimatum game it involves a third or 
dummy player who has to accept any agreement set by the other two players (the responder 
and the proposer) and thus, it provides a good possibility to study social motives that occur in 
strategic interaction (e.g. reciprocity, fairness, altruism, etc.). Though, Güth and van Damme 
(1998, p.230) report that, “there is no single rejection that can clearly be attributed to a low 
share for the dummy”, it still remains unclear whether the proposer and the responder just do 
not express other-regarding behavior in the presence of competition to achieve their own goals, 
or if they actually do not care about the dummy´s share. Evidence from the Third-Party 
Punishment game and the Dictator game, as well as the fact that the fair distribution is the most 
often offered and accepted one in the three-person ultimatum game, seem to show that players 
are concerned about the share for the powerless third. Thus, the two remaining questions are 
still: Who are the players we refer to and for what reason do we care about them?  
These questions were addressed systematically in two studies. In study 1, a standard 
anonymous setting was used, in study II; both recipients were recorded simultaneously and in 
the same room. Both studies focused on the MFN as an index for early evaluation processes in 
economic decision making. Assuming that people do not care about the dummy player, as 
predicted by behavioral economics, it was expected that the amplitude of the MFN is not 
affected by unfair offers towards the powerless third in study I. Accordingly, the MFN should 
only distinguish between fair and unfair offers towards the responder. Proposing that humans 
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are inequity avers unbalanced offers should be associated with more pronounced MFN 
amplitudes than symmetrical offers.  
The ability to predict others action or to share others emotions and feelings are two major 
determinants of social interaction. There are several functional neuroimaging studies (Carr et 
al., 2003; Jackson et al., 2005) showing that observing an emotional state of another person 
activates the same brain areas which are associated with one´s own emotional state, the so 
called empathic response. Additionally, these studies suggest that this empathic response is 
automatic and does not require conscious processing. Recent studies found that the MFN was 
also elicited while observing errors or losses made by another person (van Schie et al., 2004; 
Fukushima and Hiraki, 2006). Fukushima and Hiraki (2009) concluded in their study that the 
MFN elicited by observing others receiving a loss “reflects empathic states towards external 
agents”. In line with empathy research, differences in the MFN amplitude related to offers 
assigned to the third, passive player had been expected in study II. Furthermore, since the brain 
activity of the dummy player (yoked control) was recorded simultaneously it was possible to 
examine the difference between making a choice and having no choice or in other words 
between having power and having no power, respectively. By this means one might be able to 
specify the characteristics of the MFN more accurately which are consistently reported in 
experiments concerning economic decision making. 
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Abstract 
 
Recent years have provided increasing insights into the factors affecting economic decision 
making. Little is known about how these factors influence decisions that also bear consequences 
for other people. We examined whether decisions that also affected a third, passive player 
modulate the behavioral and neural responses to monetary offers in a modified version of the 
three-person ultimatum game. We aimed to elucidate to what extent social preferences affect 
early neuronal processing when subjects were evaluating offers that were fair or unfair to 
themselves, to the third player, or to both. As an event-related potential index for early 
evaluation processes in economic decision making, we recorded the medial frontal negativity 
(MFN) component in response to such offers. Unfair offers were rejected more often than 
equitable ones, in particular when negatively affecting the subject. While the MFN amplitude 
was higher following unfair as compared to fair offers to the subject, MFN amplitude was not 
modulated by the shares assigned to the third, passive player. Furthermore, rejection rates and 
MFN amplitudes following fair offers were positively correlated, as subjects showing lower MFN 
amplitudes following fair offers tended to reject unfair offers more often – but only if those 
offers negatively affected their own payoff. Altogether, the rejection behavior suggests that 
humans mainly care about a powerless third when they are confronted with inequality as well. 
The correlation between rejection rates and the MFN amplitude supports the notion that this 
ERP component is also modulated by positive events and highlights how our expectations 
concerning other humans’ behavior guide our own decisions. However, social preferences like 
inequality aversion and concern for the well-being of others are not reflected in this early 
neuronal response, but seem to result from later, deliberate and higher-order cognitive 
processes. 
 
  
 - 35 - 
 
 
  
 - 36 - 
 
1. Introduction 
Most economic models assume that people are solely motivated by their own material payoff, 
i.e. they always choose what is best for them. In recent years, this view, the so called self-
interest hypotheses, has been questioned. A well-known experiment which shows that this 
hypothesis does not fully account for human behavior in economic decision making is the so 
called ultimatum game (Güth et al., 1982). In this two-person game a proposer has to split a 
certain amount of money between a responder and himself followed by the decision of the 
responder whether to accept or reject it. If the offer is accepted the money is allotted 
accordingly - however, if the responder rejects the offer both players receive nothing. Assuming 
that both players behave rationally and thus do not care about the outcome of the other, the 
responder would have to accept any positive outcome and the proposer should offer the 
smallest amount of money. In reality, most of the offers accepted by the responder are about 
40%-50% of the total amount while offers below 20% are rejected with a probability of about 
50% (Güth et al., 1982; Camerer, 1995). 
Observations like these which indicate that people are self-interested but also inequality averse 
led to a reformulation of models of economic decision making, and the addition of ‘other-
regarding’ preferences to these models. More specifically, models of social preferences assume 
that people compare their own material payoff either with the payoff of each other player (Fehr 
and Schmidt, 1999) or with the average payoff across all players involved (Bolton and Ockenfels, 
2000). People feel inequity if they are worse off or better off than their reference players, 
leading to a reduction of utility. This reduction is larger for disadvantageous inequality, i.e., 
being worse off than others in material terms, than for advantageous inequality, i.e., being 
better off (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). 
Recent event-related potential (ERP) studies document that the distinction between equitable 
and disadvantageous inequitable offers is already reflected by differences in an ERP component 
occurring 270 ms after the onset of an offer in the ultimatum game (Polezzi et al., 2008). 
Characterized by a negative deflection and being more pronounced with regard to inequitable 
as compared to equitable offers, this component was interpreted in terms of the medial frontal 
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negativity (MFN; Gehring and Willoughby, 2002). These authors were one of the first who 
observed such a negative deflection in the ERP after monetary losses compared to gains. Dipole 
source modeling and results from studies using fMRI suggest the MFN signal to be generated in 
the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Martin et al., 2009). Later 
studies supported this finding and proposed the MFN signal to be related to the reinforcement 
learning system (Holroyd and Coles, 2002). The reinforcement theory states that the midbrain 
dopaminergic system codes the subjective value of a certain outcome or object as a function of 
expectancy. In that sense predicted rewards cause a phasic activation of dopaminergic neurons 
whereas the omission of a reward leads to a depression. As predicted rewards do not increase 
the firing rate, it is assumed that the mesencephalic dopaminergic system creates a reward 
prediction error signal which is conveyed to cortical regions (e.g. the ACC) to allow for the 
adaption of the behavior (Schultz, 1999; 2010).   
In line with this assumption the MFN is usually observed in tasks reflecting monetary losses 
after the onset of negative feedback (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002), or after feedback 
indicating an incorrect response (Miltner et al., 1997; Holroyd and Coles, 2002). Furthermore, 
the amplitude of the MFN is related to subjective values like social norms (Boksem and De 
Cremer, 2010), i.e. being more pronounced following unfair offers compared to fair offers when 
subjects are highly concerned by social norms. These findings among others led to the 
suggestion that the MFN is apparent whenever favorable or unfavorable events are evaluated 
along an abstract ‘good-bad’ dimension (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004a). 
Along these lines one might speculate that the MFN indicates the loss of utility when perceiving 
disadvantageous inequality. Proposing that humans are inequality averse, unbalanced offers 
unfair to one of the participants should be associated with more pronounced MFN amplitudes 
than symmetrical offers. This view is supported by behavioral studies showing that people 
prefer an equal split (Güth et al., 2007) and recent neuroimaging studies reporting ACC activity 
during the processing of unfair offers (Sanfey et al., 2003; Guroglu et al., 2011). Haruno and 
Frith (2010) (using a different experimental paradigm) also found increased activity in the ACC in 
 - 38 - 
 
relation to trials where participants received less than their counterparts. Activation was 
independent of individual differences in social value orientation.  
The standard ultimatum game represents a useful behavioral paradigm to study social aspects 
of decision making as it is simple and has been studied extensively within various disciplines and 
using different methods (for a review see Rilling and Sanfey, 2011). Nevertheless, this simplicity 
comes with some major limitations. For instance, it presupposes that players have equal needs 
for the payoff as it is usually played in anonymous context. In contrast, in a natural environment 
people mostly know with whom they interact or have at least some information about their 
counterpart. Another major disadvantage of the standard ultimatum game is the fact that 
players decide only for themselves, and decisions are not influenced by the presence of other 
people or groups. However, in real life we hardly make decisions independently of others as 
others usually observe or are even able to affect our decisions by their mere presence. The 
present study therefore attempted to overcome this limitation by adding a third player to the 
standard ultimatum game setup.  
As already mentioned, an MFN can be observed whenever subjects feel unfairly treated in the 
standard ultimatum game. Yet, the question remains how subjects evaluate offers when the 
proposer behaves unfairly towards someone else and when the decisions made affect this third 
person as well. In particular, we are interested in how the MFN amplitude is related to 
advantageous inequality as compared to disadvantageous inequality as well as to equity. In the 
present ERP study this question will be systematically addressed by introducing a third player to 
the original ultimatum game. In this version of the ultimatum game, originally developed by 
Güth and van Damme (1998), a given sum of money is split up between three players: the 
proposer, the responder, and a dummy-player, reflecting the powerless third. If accepted by the 
subjects in the role of the responder, the money will be allocated according to the split offered 
by the proposer; otherwise, no player receives any money. The powerless third is in a yoke-
situation and has no decision role in the game. This way, it is possible to study the relation 
between advantageous inequality (receiving more than the third player) and disadvantageous 
inequality (receiving less than the third player). Furthermore, by having such a fixed reference 
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agent (the third dummy-player) in contrast to the consistently changing proposers (Sanfey et al., 
2003; Polezzi et al., 2008; Boksem and De Cremer, 2010) it is possible to focus on the impact of 
social motives that occur in strategic social interactions.  
 
2. Materials and Methods 
 
2.1. Participants 
Eighteen undergraduate students (6 male; mean age = 23.2 ± 2.7 years) from the University of 
Vienna participated in the experiment. Two of these subjects had to be excluded from further 
analysis since post-experimental debriefing revealed that they had not believed in the existence 
of a third player. 
All subjects were naive to the experiment, had normal or adequately corrected vision, and were 
healthy and right-handed, as assessed by the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (EHI Oldfield, 
1971). Scores for the EHI were above 70 in all subjects. Subjects were paid for their participation 
the amount of money they earned in four randomly chosen trials, resulting in earnings between 
15 and 20 Euros on average. Written informed consent from each participant was obtained 
prior to the experiment. The study was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki 
(1973, revised in 1983) and local guidelines and regulations of the University of Vienna and the 
Faculty of Psychology. 
 
2.2. Stimulus Material 
In order to design the experimental setting realistic offers were collected pre-experimentally 
following the strategy method introduced by Selten (1965). To this end, we created six possible 
allocations with a total sum of 15 Euro as well as another six with a total of 12 Euros. Students 
from different Universities in Vienna were asked to choose one offer from each group resulting 
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in two different offers for each student. After they had chosen the offers a photograph was 
taken. These photographs together with the two offers formed the stimulus material used for 
the role of the proposers. 
Offers significant for the present study resulted from 81 subjects (40 males) and were either fair 
(1/3 of the total amount) to all three players, unfair to the responder and the third player (both 
received less than 15%), or unfair to only one player (receiving less than 15%), whereas one of 
the others received at least one third of the whole amount. In total each of these four different 
categories consisted of 27 offers. The remaining 54 offers were neither really unfair (less than 
15%) nor fair (1/3 of the total amount). In all these conditions the proposers allocated at least 
1/3 of the total amount to themselves. In total 162 offers were presented in six blocks with 
containing 27 offers each. 
 
2.3. Paradigm and Procedure 
Participants played as responders in a modified version of the three-person ultimatum game 
(Güth and Van Damme, 1998). To ensure that participants believed in the presence of a dummy 
player, i.e. a third player, subjects were informed as part of the cover story that a second 
subject of the same gender as the subject him/herself participated in the experiment in a 
different EEG lab within the same building. In order to increase the feasibility of this setup, 
subjects were introduced to a second experimenter who supposedly was in charge of preparing 
the third player for EEG recordings and for running the experiment in the other lab. 
All subjects received written instructions about the experimental task and were informed that 
they themselves, as well as the other players, would receive the amount of money from four 
randomly chosen trials. To save money only the four most successful proposers would receive 
compensation. Furthermore, subjects were shown the questionnaires filled out by the 
proposers to emphasize that the proposals were made by real persons. To avoid possible effects 
on the decisions to be made due to the physical appearance of the proposers, photographs 
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were not presented prior to each offer (c.f. Solnick and Schweitzer, 1999), but - following a 
suggestion by Knoch and colleagues (2006) - prior to each of the six blocks.  
Hence, each block started with the presentation of photographs of the 27 proposers of the 
upcoming trials, followed by 27 offers which subjects had to accept or reject (Figure 1). The 
presentation of these offers, written in German (light gray background, black font color), 
consisted of three lines: the first line always contained the amount the proposer wanted to keep 
(e.g. “John gets 4€”), the second indicated the amount the responder, i.e. the participant, would 
receive (e.g. “You get 4€”), and the third line indicated the amount the third player would get 
(e.g. “Player 2 gets 4€”). After 4000 ms two squares appeared below the offer, each of which 
either contained the word “accept” or “reject”. These two alternatives changed the position 
randomly among the trials. Subjects were instructed to press the corresponding button of a 
response pad (PST Serial Response Box by Psychology Software Tools, Inc.) with their right hand 
to indicate the chosen alternative. Immediately after the response, a feedback of the actual 
allocation (format similar to the offers) was given for 2000 ms. A variable interval of a mean 
duration of 2500 ms +/- 200 ms presenting a black fixation cross on a light gray screen 
separated the trials (offers). At the end of each block subjects were informed about the amount 
of money they had gained so far. To further ensure that participants believed in the presence of 
the other participant, i.e., the third player, 12 randomly chosen trials were followed by 
questions concerning the current offer (e.g.: 'Was the proposer male or female?'). Subjects were 
told that these questions have to be answered by the third player to maintain his or her 
attention to the task. As there was no real dummy-player, answers in reality were given by the 
experimenter who was in a different room. Initiated at the subjects' own pace, the next block of 
trials started, again with the introduction of the subsequent proposers. 
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Figure 1| Single-trial setting. Trials started with a fixation cross with a variable time interval, followed by the 
presentation of the offer. After the duration of 4 sec two boxes appeared at the bottom of the screen indicating 
that participants can respond. Upon pressing the button, the feedback was presented. On 12 randomly chosen 
trials the feedback was followed by questions to be answered by the third player. 
 
Stimulus presentation was controlled by a Pentium IV 3.00 GHz computer and E-prime software 
(E-prime 2.0, Psychology Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania). The whole experiment 
lasted for approximately 50 minutes including the short breaks between the blocks. After the 
experimental session subjects were debriefed, i.e. they were informed about the purpose of the 
experiment and the fact that no real third player had been present. 
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2.4. Electrophysiological recordings 
Participants were seated comfortably in a sound-attenuated and dimly lit room in front of a 19-
inch cathode ray tube monitor. EEG data from each subject were recorded via 61 Ag/AgCl 
equidistantly located scalp electrodes embedded in an elastic cap (EASYCAP GmbH, Herrsching, 
Germany; montage M10), referenced to non-cephalic balanced sterno-vertebral electrodes 
(Stephenson and Gibbs, 1951). For eye movement artifact correction vertical and horizontal 
electro-oculograms (VEOG, HEOG) were recorded bipolar from above and below the left eye 
(VEOG) and from right and left outer canthi (HEOG). The subjects’ skin was slightly scratched 
with a sterile needle at all recording sites in order to minimize skin potential artifacts and to 
ascertain homogeneous electrode impedances below 2 kΩ. Signals were amplified using a DC-
amplifier with high baseline stability and an input impedance of 100 GΩ (Ing. Kurt Zickler GmbH, 
Pfaffstätten, Austria). Signals were digitized with a 1 kHz sampling rate and recorded within a 
frequency range from DC to 250 Hz. 
 
2.5. Data processing and analysis 
Reaction times (RT) were transformed using a logarithmic function (Knutson et al., 2007). RTs 
were then analyzed by means of a repeated-measures ANOVA with the two within-subjects 
factors self-related fairness (levels: fair, unfair) and other-related fairness (levels: fair, unfair); 
the first being the assignment to the responder and the second to the dummy player. For the 
comparison of rejection rates, a Friedman test was used. 
Eye movement and blink artifacts were first eliminated using a linear regression approach on 
the basis of parameters obtained in pre-experimental calibration trials (Bauer and Lauber, 
1979). Blink coefficients were identified using a template matching procedure. Blink correction 
was then performed by subtracting vertical and horizontal EOG signals weighted this way from 
each EEG channel. Subsequently, epochs of 800 ms following the presentation onset of the offer 
were extracted and baseline-corrected by subtracting the mean amplitude in the interval 200 
ms before presentation onset. Data were then down-sampled to 250 smp/s and low pass 
 - 44 - 
 
filtered (6dB/octave slope) at 30 Hz cutoff. Before averaging the data were detrended, i.e. linear 
trends in the EEG signals were removed using the function “detrend” provided by EEGLAB 6.03b 
(Delorme and Makeig, 2004). To further improve data quality, e.g. correcting for residual 
artifacts occurring repeatedly, we followed the approach as outlined in Delorme and colleagues 
(2007): Trials containing strong non-stereotype artifacts like movement or muscle-artifacts were 
rejected from further analysis based on visual inspection followed by an independent 
component analysis (ICA) using the extended infomax algorithm (Bell and Sejnowski, 1995; Lee 
et al., 1999) as implemented in the EEGLAB toolbox 6.03b (Delorme and Makeig, 2004). 
Individual independent components were screened for time courses and maps reflecting typical 
artifacts and then removed by back-projecting only the remaining, non-artifact components to 
the voltage time series. 
Based on visual inspection of the grand-averaged waveforms and scalp distributions of 
difference waves (Figure 2 and Figure 3) the MFN was quantified as the average baseline-
corrected amplitude value in the time range between 240 and 340 ms after stimulus (offer) 
onset at electrode FCz (Boksem and De Cremer, 2010; Wu et al., 2011). To reduce confounding 
effects of other ERP components on the amplitude of the MFN we created difference waves by 
subtracting ERPs elicited by offers with an equal share for all three players from the ERPs 
elicited by each of the three inequitable offers (unfair share for the subject, the dummy, or 
both). Additionally we created two difference waves by subtracting MFNs during Other fair from 
Other unfair for the two levels of fairness for the subject (Self Fair, Self Unfair). MFN amplitudes 
of difference waves were quantified as the average voltage in the 280 to 360 ms time interval at 
FCz, against the pre-stimulus baseline. 
MFN amplitude values at the selected location were submitted to separate 2x2 repeated 
measurement ANOVAs with the factors Self (levels: fair and unfair offers to the responder) and 
Other (levels: fair and unfair offers to the dummy player). These analyses were aimed to 
describe whether an observed effect can be interpreted in terms of the offer made to the 
responder (factor Self), or to the dummy player (factor Other; Boksem et al., 2011). All factors 
were defined as within-subject factors. The degrees of freedom for repeated measures ANOVAs 
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were Greenhouse-Geisser corrected whenever appropriate. To test whether difference waves 
are significantly different from zero a one-sample t-test was applied to the average voltage 
between 280 to 360 ms at FCz. In addition, to scrutinize potential differences in processing the 
outcome for the powerless third, controlled for the two outcomes for the responding subject, 
we conducted a paired sample t-test on MFN difference waves. For all analyses the significance 
threshold was set to p ≤ 0.05. Finally, to assess the relation between early neuronal processes 
and actual behavior, MFN amplitudes for each condition as well as the associated difference 
waves (unfair minus fair) at channel FCz were analyzed in relation to the rejection rates of 
unequal offers using Pearson correlation coefficients (using directed, one-tailed significance 
levels; based on the results of Hewig et al., 2011). 
 
3 Results 
 
3.1. Behavioral Results 
Analysis of the reaction times (see Table 1) revealed a significant main effect for the factor Self 
(F(1,15)=9.591 p=.031 eta²=.275) and a significant Self x Other interaction (F(1,15)=5.682 
p=.007, partial η²=.390). In case both –  responder and dummy –  received an equally high share 
the shortest mean reaction times (1076.85 ms, SD = 227.62) were observed, while offers unfair 
to the responder but fair to the dummy showed the longest mean reaction time (1230.31 ms, 
SD=220.62). There was a statistically significant difference in rejection rates depending on the 
type of offer, χ²(3)=22.552, p<.001. Post-hoc analyses with Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Tests were 
conducted with a Bonferroni correction applied, resulting in an individual significance level of P 
= .008. There was no significant difference in rejection rates when comparing offers with an 
unfair share for the responder (unfair/fair vs. unfair/unfair; Z= -1.398, p=.162). Despite an 
overall reduction in rejection rates for offers with a comparatively low share for the dummy 
(fair/unfair), rejection rates did not significantly differ from offers with a low share for both 
players (unfair/unfair; Z=-2.120 , p=.034) or offers with a low share for the responder 
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(unfair/fair, Z=-2.552, p=.011). However, when both players received a fair share offers were 
accepted significantly more often than all the other possible offers (all p<.001). 
 
 
Table 1| Behavioral results from the three-person Ultimatum Game. Reaction times (in ms) with standard 
deviations in brackets and relative frequencies of rejections (in %) are given. 
 fairR / fairD fairR / unfairD unfairR / fairD unfairR  / unfairD 
     
Mean RT 1076.32 1221.96 1230.31 1150.16 
(SD) (227.62) (251.42) (220.62) (231.59) 
     
Rejection Rate 3.00% 39.35% 64.96% 70.37% 
 
 
 
3.2. ERP data 
Analysis of the MFN amplitude revealed a significant main effect for Self, (F(1, 15) = 5.589 
p=.032, partial η²=.271) whereas, the factor Other did not reach significance (F(1, 15) = 1.033, p 
>.10, partial η²=.064). There were no significant interaction effects (F(1,15)=1.253, p>.10, partial 
η²=.077). The largest, more negative going, MFN amplitude was found for offers where only the 
responder received a low share (mean +/- SD, 1.79 μV +/- 3.64), and offers assigning a low share 
to only the dummy were accompanied by the least pronounced MFN amplitude (3.56 μV +/- 
2.28; see Figure 2). Thus, the MFN only distinguishes between fair and unfair offers for the 
responder, being larger for unfair offers, irrespective of the share for the dummy.  
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Figure 2| Grand average ERP waveforms at Fz, Fcz, Cz and Pz for the offers: fair/fair (solid line), fair/unfair (dashed 
line), unfair/fair (gray line), or unfair/unfair (dotted line). Negative is plotted up, Zeros on the timeline indicate the 
onset of the offer; format: responder/dummy. 
 
Analysis of difference waves confirmed this finding. Again, the amplitude of the difference wave 
associated with offers that comprise a low share for the responder and a high share for the 
other players (unfair/fair minus fair/fair) was most pronounced and significantly different from 
zero (mean=-1.643, t(15)=-2.491, p=.025, d=.881). Otherwise, subtracting ERPs elicited by equal 
offers (fair/fair) from ERPs elicited by offers with a low share for the dummy (fair/unfair) did not 
yield a difference wave significantly different from zero (t(15)=.199, p=.845, d=.069). In addition, 
comparing unfair offers assigned to the dummy when responders themselves received a fair 
share as compared to an unfair share did not yield a significant  difference either (t(15)=1.119, 
p=.281, dz=.028). The amplitudes of the difference waves reached their maximum 310 ms 
following offer onset, with a scalp distribution peaking over the fronto-central area (Figure 3). 
The same applied for P3 neither main effects nor interactions reached the level of significance 
(all p >.093).  
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Figure 3| Scalp potential topography of the average voltage differences between equal offers (fair/fair) and the 
three unequal offers (fair/unfair, unfair/fair and unfair/unfair) for the time point of the MFN (240 - 340 ms 
following offer onset). The bar chart depicts the respective mean MFN amplitude values. Error bars indicate 1 SE.  
 
To investigate the relationship between electrophysiological data and behavioral choices we 
conducted correlation analyses. Previous research on the standard ultimatum game found that 
MFN amplitudes following fair offers were related to rejection rates of offers with unequal splits 
(Hewig et al., 2011). Even though this statistical relationship could not be explained by their 
data and had not been measured or reported in previous studies, similar results were obtained 
in the present study: MFN amplitudes associated with equal offers were related to rejection 
rates of offers with an unequal split (see Table 2). Notably, this was only the case when 
responders themselves received a low share: Rejections rates of offers with low shares for both 
players, the responder and the dummy-player, were positively related to the MFN amplitude 
associated with equally fair offers (r=.46, p=.037). Likewise, responders who frequently rejected 
offers with a low share for themselves exhibited smaller MFN amplitudes following equal offers 
(r=.60, p=.007). No correlations (p>.475) were observed for the other correlation analyses (see 
Table 2 for all correlations). 
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Table 2| Correlations between mean MFN amplitudes for equal (fair/fair) offers and rejection rates of the different 
offers *p<.01, **p<.05 
 fairR / fairD fairR / unfairD unfairR / fairD unfairR  / unfairD 
MFN at FCz -,071 ,017 .598** .458** 
 
 
4 Discussion 
The aim of this study was to investigate how the behavioral and neural responses of a 
responder in an ultimatum game are affected by a third, passive player. Since the MFN has been 
associated with early evaluation processes in economic decision making, the analysis focused on 
this ERP component. Usually the MFN is more negative going when people experience an 
undesirable outcome or event compared to a more acceptable one. We assumed that involving 
a third player might affect the way people evaluate their payoffs, and in turn modulate the MFN 
amplitudes. To this end, we recorded EEG from participants playing in the role of the responders 
in a modified version of the three-person ultimatum game. Overall, the results indicate that 
people dissociate between high and low offers assigned to them. In particular, the amplitude 
differences about 300ms after the presentation of the offer can be mainly explained by the 
share for oneself, while the non-significant main effect for other-related fairness suggests that 
the subjects’ neural responses were not indexing the fairness of offers to the powerless third. In 
addition, no effect was found when comparing difference waves between fair and unfair offers 
assigned to the powerless third. Furthermore, though there seems to be a relation between 
MFN amplitude and behavior in the ultimatum game (Hewig et al., 2011), this effect was only 
observed with offers that negatively affected the responder’s payoff. 
Previous ERP studies on the two-person ultimatum game have shown that offers with a low 
share for the responder were associated with more pronounced MFN amplitudes as compared 
to offers with equal ones (Boksem and De Cremer, 2010; Hewig et al., 2011; Wu et al., 2011). 
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The MFN is believed to reflect a subjective motivational judgment indicating whether an event 
or outcome is better or worse than expected (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Nieuwenhuis et 
al., 2004a). In line with this assumption people who are more concerned about fairness norms 
exhibit more pronounced MFN amplitudes following norm violations in the ultimatum game 
(Boksem and De Cremer, 2010). Furthermore, several authors have shown that an MFN can be 
observed when gambling task outcomes refer to someone else (van Schie et al., 2004; 
Fukushima and Hiraki, 2006). Even when the task performance of others does not affect the 
subjects themselves, particularly those with high trait empathy have higher MFN amplitudes 
when the other person makes a mistake and loses money (Fukushima and Hiraki, 2009). 
Therefore, we assumed that the MFN would be as well modulated by an unfair share towards 
the third player. According to a recent neuroimaging study advantageous inequity as compared 
to disadvantageous inequity is less rewarding as indicated by reduced activity in brain areas that 
are associated with reward processing. Subjects who were better off in material terms than 
their counterparts showed less activity in ventral striatum and ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
when they received money that augmented the difference in payoff (Tricomi et al., 2010). 
Following the concept of inequality aversion, we expected unequal offers always to be 
associated with higher MFN amplitudes than equal ones. This assumption was not confirmed by 
the data. A recent study using the two-person ultimatum game found that MFN amplitude 
differences following fair and unfair offers were not modulated by observing the allocation 
outcome of other unrelated responders – proposer dyads (Wu et al., 2011). Involving a third 
player we found similar results as Wu and colleagues, suggesting that neither an external 
reference point nor a fixed reference agent clearly modulate this early ERP component. 
Furthermore, in a social comparison task prosocial subjects responded with higher amygdala 
activity and felt more unpleasant in response to unequal payoffs. Individualist showed the 
opposite pattern, i.e., an increase in reward difference was associated with decreased activity in 
the amygdala (Haruno and Frith, 2010). The ACC, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the 
anterior insula, i.e., brain areas that have been associated with the processing of unfair offers in 
the ultimatum game (Sanfey et al., 2003), were found to show higher activity when subjects 
received less than their counterpart. Interestingly those regions were similarly activated in 
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prosocial subjects and individualist. Since it is supposed that the MFN is generated in the ACC 
according to Gehring and Willoughby (2002), our results broaden these findings due to the 
higher temporal resolution of the EEG and suggest that the initial response is mainly self-
related. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that the three players in our experiment 
remained anonymous to each other, which is the standard procedure in these kind of paradigms 
(Camerer, 1995; Güth et al., 2007). This is in contrast to studies that found evidence for a 
component that might be interpreted as an other-related MFN where pairs were either seated 
in the same room or knew each other already prior to the experiment (Fukushima and Hiraki, 
2006; 2009). Thus, it might be possible that decreasing the degree of psychological or physical 
distance between players might have resulted in different behavioral and neuronal responses.  
However, concerning the behavioral responses we found consistency with previous behavioral 
studies. Participants preferred equal shares, whereas offers with a low share for the responder 
were rejected most frequently (Güth et al., 2007). Furthermore, in line with previous ERP 
studies (Boksem and De Cremer, 2010; Hewig et al., 2011) no relation between the amplitude of 
the MFN difference wave and rejection rates were found. Nevertheless, MFN amplitude 
following equitable offers was highly related to rejection rates of offers with low shares for the 
responder. This finding has already been reported in previous studies on the two-person 
ultimatum game (e.g. Hewig et al., 2011). Several studies on the MFN are based on the 
assumption that alterations of the amplitudes are solely related to the processing of negative 
events or events that are worse than expected (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Nieuwenhuis et 
al., 2004a). According to Holroyd and Coles (2002; 2008), though, unexpected negative events 
would have an enhancing effect, unexpected positive events would have an attenuating effect 
on the MFN amplitude. Pedroni and colleagues (2011) argue that there are actually two 
processes that occur at the time a MFN can be observed, an evaluation on a good-bad 
dimension, as proposed in previous studies, and the evaluation of the (positive) reward value. In 
light of the assumption that positive and particularly unexpected positive events lead to a 
change in MFN amplitude, Hewig and colleagues (2011) propose two possible explanations for 
the relation between rejections rates and MFN amplitudes following equal offers. Either more 
reward sensitive participants reject unfair offers because they are disappointed, or those who 
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expect others to be selfish are more likely to reject unfair offers, due to their negative view of 
others. More precisely, if offers with a high share for oneself are related to stronger reward-
related responses, these offers are also accompanied by a reduction in MFN amplitude. In this 
regard participants with lower MFN amplitudes following equal offers are more disappointed 
when offered a relatively small amount and hereupon reject these proposals. On the other hand 
if participants believe that proposers are rather selfish by keeping most of the money for 
themselves, they may expect receiving mainly unequal offers. This negative view of others 
might lead to higher rejection rates and smaller MFN amplitudes in relation to equal “better 
than expected” proposals. Our findings provide some new insights on this relation between 
neural and behavioral response. In the study by Hewig and colleagues (2011) offers with an 
equal amount for both players represented the highest possible reward for the responder. In 
the present study there are two possible conditions with high shares for the responder. Equal 
offers as well as advantageous unequal offers denote a high share for the responder. Assuming 
that reward sensitivity predicts decision behavior, both offers with high shares for the 
responder should be related to rejection rates or at least should be related to each other. Yet, 
such a relation could not be established in the present study. Only equal offers were related to 
decision behavior. This evidence suggests that in the context of social interaction our 
expectations concerning the behavior of others might already guide our own behavior. Similarly, 
in contradiction to the hypotheses that negative emotions following unfair offers might 
facilitate memory for cheaters (Mealey et al., 1996; Vanneste et al., 2007; Barclay, 2008), a 
recent study on the standard two person ultimatum game found that the proposers' behavior 
per se does not enhance memory. Conversely, when offers did not meet the expectations of the 
responders, they remembered the proposers' face more efficiently (Chang and Sanfey, 2009).     
Importantly, the so-called power coalition – the third player receives far less than the other two 
players – was rejected quite frequently. Rejections of those offers were not at all related to 
MFN amplitudes. Similarly a recent study measuring skin conductance responses (SCR) revealed 
that an inequitable offer in the standard two person game is followed by an increase in SCR. 
However, when people are playing the two-person ultimatum game on behalf of another 
person, they do not show this increase in SCR following an unfair offer. Yet, these offers were 
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rejected as often as when playing for themselves. Therefore, affective responses were solely 
related to self-relatedness, while behavioral responses were not (Civai et al., 2010). This 
suggests that economic decisions are not necessarily always related to the emotional response – 
in particular when there is enough time for a controlled, deliberative process. Yet, when these 
deliberative processes are inhibited by time pressure, decisions as in the ultimatum game are 
only guided by affective processes as indicated by an increase in rejection rate (Sutter et al., 
2003; Cappelletti et al., 2008). In the present study participants had unlimited time to decide 
whether to accept or reject an offer, which might also explain the discrepancy between the 
early neuronal and the subsequent behavioral response especially with regard to offers that 
affect the third, passive player. Nevertheless, note that the neuroimaging study on inequality 
aversion by Haruno and Frith (2010) suggests that the amygdala activity in response to unequal 
reward pairs reflects a rapid intuitive response. This assumption is based on the finding that 
cognitive load had no effect on inequality aversion. Evaluation of reward differences and 
reaction time did not differ in a high cognitive load compared to a low-load condition. This is in 
line with behavioral studies on the ultimatum game that found no difference in rejection rates 
under cognitive load, whereas, responders reject unfair offers more often under time pressure 
(Sutter et al., 2003; Cappelletti et al., 2008). Of course, it would have been interesting to 
elucidate later parts of the decision making process, but this is beyond the scope of the present 
work. Nevertheless, the relation between the different parts of the decision making process is 
of central importance to gain a more accurate and exhaustive understanding of (economic) 
decision making. 
Taken together, the results of the present study show that inequality aversion cannot explain 
variability in the early neuronal evaluation process. On an early neuronal level, humans dislike 
disadvantageous inequality and seem to favor advantageous inequality. Although the decision 
behavior observed in this study suggests that humans care about the powerless third, there is 
no evidence for an early affective response suggesting that subjects do not care about what the 
other person receives. Thus, we propose that the first automatic response to inequality is 
mainly self-related, whereas, concerns for the well-being of others are part of higher cognitive, 
deliberative or intuitive processes following the first automatic response.  
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Abstract  
 
In the present study ERPs were recorded simultaneously while two participants were playing the 
three-person ultimatum game. Both participants received different offers from changing 
proposers about how to split up a certain amount of money between the three players. One of 
the participants had no say; whereas the other was able to harm the payoff of all other players. 
The aim of the study was to investigate how the outcomes of the respective other are evaluated 
by participants who were treated fairly or unfairly themselves and to what extent agency 
influences concerns for fairness. Analyses were focused on the medial frontal negativity (MFN) 
as an early index for subjective value assignment. Recipients with veto-power exhibited 
enhanced, more negative-going, MFN amplitudes following proposals that comprised a low 
share for both recipients, suggesting that responders favored offers with a fair amount to at 
least one of the two players. Though, the powerless players cared about the amount assigned to 
the responder, MFN amplitudes were larger following fair compared to unfair offers assigned to 
the responder. Similarly, concerns for fairness which determined the amplitude of the MFN, 
suggested that the powerless players exhibited negative and conversely the responders, 
positive social preferences. 
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1 Introduction 
Comparative processes are essential to assess the emotional meaning assigned to a given 
situation. Whether we perceive something as pleasant or unpleasant depends on the 
alternatives and their accessibility (Ben-Ze'ev, 2000). For example, a rewarding stimulus might 
get devalued in situations associated with feelings of anger or envy. Thus, the nature of 
emotions elicited by the reception, omission, or termination of reward or punishment depends 
on what we expect and on what others receive in comparison to one selves (Festinger, 1954; 
Rolls, 2005). This circumstance becomes apparent when looking at recent findings in the field of 
neuroeconomics investigating how people evaluate specific situations associated with reward or 
punishment in relation to significant others using simple experimental games.  
One, beside several others (for review see Rilling and Sanfey, 2011) commonly used 
experimental game to study reward related decision processes and the underlying neural 
correlates in a social context, is the Ultimatum Game (UG; Güth et al., 1982). In its original 
version a proposer is endowed with a sum of money he has to share with a responder. He/she 
can send any positive amount to the responder, who in turn has the possibility to reject or 
accept the proposed division of money. If the proposed distribution is accepted by the 
responder, money will be allocated accordingly. Otherwise, if rejected by the responder, both 
receive nothing. The proposer can make only one proposal, all players are anonymous to each 
other, and the game ends after the responder has made his/her decision. Of course, the aim of 
each player in this bargaining game is to maximize money. Nevertheless, most responders are 
willing to abandon their division if it is smaller than 20% of the total amount and proposers offer 
about 40% to 50% of the total amount (Güth et al., 1982; Thaler, 1988; Güth and Van Damme, 
1998). Though, behavior in this game seems to be rather irrational, results are very robust and 
do not markedly change with the size of the stake (Slonim and Roth, 1998; Cameron, 1999; 
Munier and Costin, 2002). Even demographic variables, intellectual abilities, and socio-economic 
status do not modulate behavior in this game (Güth et al., 2007; Nguyen et al., 2011).  
There are several regions in the brain that are implicated in the representation of the subjective 
value of reward and punishment (for reviews see, Schultz, 2006; Grabenhorst and Rolls, 2011). 
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One of these, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and in particular its dorsal part, might be of 
particular importance in the comparative processes discussed above. In comparison with other 
areas associated with the representation of reward, the ACC integrates various aspects of a 
decision, e.g., probability, payoff, and effort (Kennerley et al., 2009; 2011). Furthermore, the 
ACC not only evaluates values of alternatives during choice, but also the consequences of 
choices made. However, this region is not necessarily related to actual decision behavior (Seo 
and Lee, 2007; Luk and Wallis, 2009). For this, the ACC receives input from different neuronal 
sources associated with certain qualities of reward and has strong connections to motor areas 
(e.g. Vogt et al., 1992). All of these are requirements needed to synthesize these various aspects 
of a given situations and to adapt preferences in light of the current goal and the effort that has 
to be taken. 
Hence, it is not surprising that activation in the dorsal part of the ACC (dACC) is consistently 
reported in neuroimaging studies investigating decision processes in the UG (Sanfey et al., 2003; 
Gospic et al., 2011; Kirk et al., 2011); irrespective of participant’s age (Guroglu et al., 2011). 
Electrophysiological studies provide further evidence for the involvement of the dACC in the 
context of the UG. The medial frontal negativity (MFN), an event related potential which is 
supposed to be generated in the dACC (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Luu et al., 2003; Wessel 
et al., 2012), can be observed after the receipt of negative compared to positive feedback 
(Miltner et al., 1997; Luu et al., 2003; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004b), after events that deviate from 
what we expect (Potts et al., 2006; Hajcak et al., 2007; Pfabigan et al., 2011), and in response to 
losses compared to gains (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002), irrespective of whether an action or 
choice preceded (Donkers et al., 2005; Martin et al., 2009). Furthermore, a similar negative 
deflection can be reported when we observe someone else receiving negative feedback or 
losing money (Fukushima and Hiraki, 2009). Generally, it is assumed that the MFN discriminates 
events on an abstract good-bad dimension (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004a; Hajcak et al., 2006) or 
whether a goal has been achieved or not (Holroyd et al., 2006). Given that the MFN can be 
observed already 250ms after the onset of an event it is used as an index for early evaluation 
processes in economic decision making. Having in mind that for some individuals the subjective 
value assigned to a certain reward highly depends on what others receive, the MFN should as 
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well be modulated by social preferences like inequality aversion, altruism, or reciprocity. This 
has been confirmed in parts by studies investigating the UG. Since, fair offers elicited more 
positive MFN amplitudes than unfair offers and thus, are preferred in view of the assumptions 
on the MFN (e.g. Boksem and De Cremer, 2010; Hewig et al., 2011). Though results show that 
differences in MFN amplitude are related to concerns for fairness and rejection rate (Boksem 
and De Cremer, 2010; Hewig et al., 2011), it is unclear to what extent MFN amplitude 
differences between fair and unfair offers are affected by the proposer himself as a reference 
agent, or does the MFN just differentiate between high and low amounts of money? A recent 
electrophysiological study investigated the influence of social comparison on behavior in the UG 
and MFN amplitudes by adding a social reference point, i.e., average proposals in other 
proposer-responder dyads were also presented to the responders (Wu et al., 2011); yet, no 
influence on the MFN amplitude could be reported. In a previous study we added a human 
agent as a reference point by employing a three-person UG (Alexopoulos et al., 2012). This third 
player, a dummy-player so to speak, had no bearing in the game itself. Money had to be split up 
between all three players, and the responder, who’s EEG was recorded during the game, had to 
accept or reject the allocation as otherwise customary in the standard UG. Results, as indicated 
by the MFN amplitudes, showed that responders only differentiated between fair and unfair 
offers towards themselves disregarding the share assigned to the dummy-player. Nevertheless, 
disadvantageously unequal, unfair offers assigned to the responder were followed by the most 
pronounced MFN amplitude. From there suggested that the third person had an impact on the 
responders´ MFNs, and that he/she acts as the relevant reference agent responders care about. 
Though, several studies suggested that empathic concerns are reflected in the MFN, the MFN 
observed in the responders seemed to be associated with negative social preferences. 
Nevertheless, it must be considered that participants were usually acquainted with each other 
whereas, dummy-players were unacquainted and in fact there presence was simulated in our 
study. Therefore, one could assume that the actual presence of the dummy-player could have 
changed the direction of social preferences. 
In the current study we therefore aimed to clarify whether pre-play communication and the 
actual presence of the third player changes the pattern of MFN amplitudes. To this end, we 
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recorded EEG simultaneously from both recipients – the responder and the dummy-player – 
while they were playing the three-person UG using the same setting as reported in Alexopoulos 
et al. (2012). Since, several studies have shown that pre-play communication facilitates 
cooperation in social dilemma or bargaining games, respectively (for a survey see Crawford, 
1998), we expected a similar effect on the early neural processes. More precisely, we expect a 
more negative MFN difference wave for unfair compared to fair offers assigned to the third 
player and an interaction of unfairness towards oneself with unfairness towards the other for 
unsubtracted, non-difference, ERP amplitudes. Additionally, given that the dummy-players had 
no impact on the game, i.e., they could not punish unfair treatment, they acted as a yoked 
control group to clarify the impact of agency. 
In addition to the ERP data individual concerns for fairness were collected, as previous studies 
reported that fairness concerns are related to MFN amplitude differences (Boksem and De 
Cremer, 2010). To this end we applied a justice sensitivity scale (Schmitt et al., 2004; Schmitt et 
al., 2010), which measures the degree to which individuals are concerned about injustice 
towards oneself and others.  
 
2 Materials and Methods 
 
2.1 Participants 
Thirty-six undergraduate students (16 males; mean age = 23.3 ± 2.69 years) from the University 
of Vienna participated in the experiment. All subjects were healthy, right handed and naïve to 
the paradigm applied. Handedness was assessed using the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory 
(Oldfield, 1971). Subjects were paid between 15 and 20 Euros on average; actual earnings 
depended on their performance in the game.  
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The study was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki (1973, revised in 1983) 
and local guidelines and regulations of the University of Vienna and the Faculty of Psychology. 
Written informed consent was obtained prior to the experiment. 
 
2.2 Justice Sensitivity 
Individual differences in the perception of justice were measured using the Justice Sensitivity 
Inventory (Schmitt et al., 2004; 2010). This 40 item questionnaire encompasses justice 
sensitivity from four different perspectives: the victim, the observer, the perpetrator and the 
beneficiary. Each of the four subscales is covered by 10 questions that participants have to 
answer on a six-point Likert scale ranging from 0 to 5. Correlations between socially desirable 
and undesirable traits (Schmitt et al., 2004) as well as results from social bargaining games 
suggest that observer and beneficiary sensitivity reflect the degree to which a person is 
concerned about injustice towards others (Fetchenhauer and Huang, 2004). High scores on the 
domain victim sensitivity reflect concerns for justice towards oneself and are related to rather 
selfish behavior (Gollwitzer et al., 2009). 
 
2.3 Stimulus Material 
Altogether 324 proposals representing different divisions of the amount of 12, 15 or 18 Euros 
between the three players were presented. Half of these proposals were generated by the 
computer; the other half was provided by human proposers collected pre-experimentally (for 
details see Alexopoulos et al., 2012). In each of the two condition (computer/human proposer) 
subjects received 27 fair offers (1/3 of the total amount for each player), 27 offers twice with an 
unfair share for one player only (receiving less than 15 %, whereas the other one received 1/3), 
and further 27 offers with an unfair share for both receivers. In addition, 54 offers were 
presented that did not meet any of the previous criteria and were therefore excluded from 
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further analysis. In all condition the proposers allocated at least 1/3 of the total amount to 
themselves (see Fig.1 for examples of the different categories). 
 
 
 
Figure 1| Schematic representation of the three-person UG. Structure of a single trial (for detailed description see 
text) and the four conditions each with an exemplary allocation.  
 
In accordance with our previous study (Alexopoulos et al., 2012) the presentation of these 
proposals, written in German (light gray background, black font color), consisted of three lines: 
the first line contained the amount the proposer (e.g. “John gets 4€”) or the computer (e.g. “The 
computer gets 4€”) wanted to keep, the second indicated the amount the responder, i.e., the 
participant, would receive (e.g. “Player 1 gets 4€”), and the third line indicated the amount the 
third player would get (e.g. “Player 2 gets 4€”). Offers were presented in six blocks with rest 
periods of varying duration in between. During these breaks both players were presented with 
the photographs of the proposers of the subsequent trials. Stimulus presentation was controlled 
by a Pentium IV 3.00 GHz computer using E-prime software (E-prime 2.0, Psychology Software 
Tools, Inc., Sharpsburg, Maryland). 
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2.4 Paradigm and Procedure 
Participants were invited in gender-matched pairs. Upon arrival we ensured that these pairs 
were not acquainted with one another in any way. Then they were informed about the further 
procedure, received written instructions concerning the nature of three-person UG and were 
prepared for EEG recordings. In order to increase the feasibility of this setup and to emphasize 
that half of the proposals were made by human agents, both were shown the completed 
questionnaires of the proposers and were informed that they themselves, as well as the other 
players, would receive the amount of money they earned on four randomly chosen trials in their 
respective roles in this game. The roles (i.e., dummy-player or responder) were randomly 
assigned. 
Throughout the experiment, the two sat opposite each other without visible contact in a sound-
attenuated and dimly lit room. Both participants were seated in front of a 19-inch cathode ray 
tube monitor and were about 1.2 m apart from each other.  
Each block of trials started with the introduction of the proposers, followed by 54 offers which 
had to be accepted or rejected by the subjects in the role of the responder (Fig. 1). Trials were 
pseudo-randomized, hence each block contained the same number of human and computer 
offers. Offers were presented for 4000ms followed by two squares apparent below the offer, 
each either containing the word “accept” or “reject”. These two alternatives changed their 
position randomly among the trials. Responders were instructed to press the corresponding 
button of a response pad (PST Serial Response Box by Psychology Software Tools, Inc.) with 
their right hand to indicate the chosen alternative. Subsequently feedback was given for the 
duration of 2000ms. The format of the feedback was similar to the offer and indicated the 
actual allocation. Trials were separated by a variable inter-trial interval with a duration of 
2300ms to 2700ms during which a black fixation cross was presented. At the end of each block 
participants were informed about the amount of money they had gained so far followed by the 
introduction of the subsequent proposers. To maintain the attention of the other participant, 
i.e., the third player, twelve randomly chosen trials were followed by questions concerning the 
current offer (e.g.: 'Was the proposer male or female?'). Below these questions two squares 
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appeared, each of which either contained the word “yes” or “no” and subjects in the role of the 
third player had to press the corresponding button to answer. For every correct answer both 
subjects received 0.50 Euros additional to the outcome of four randomly chosen trials. 
 
2.5 Electrophysiological recordings 
EEG data from both subjects were recorded via 61 Ag/AgCl equidistantly located scalp 
electrodes embedded in an elastic cap (EASYCAP GmbH, Herrsching, Germany; montage M10), 
referenced to non-cephalic balanced sterno-vertebral electrodes (Stephenson and Gibbs, 1951). 
For eye movement artifact correction vertical and horizontal electro-oculograms (VEOG, HEOG) 
were recorded bipolarily from above and below the left eye (VEOG), and from right and left 
outer canthi (HEOG). The subjects’ skin was slightly scratched with a sterile needle at all 
recording sites in order to minimize skin potential artifacts and to ascertain homogeneous 
electrode impedances below 2 kΩ. Simultaneously recorded signals were amplified using two 
separate DC-amplifiers with high baseline stability and an input impedance of 100 GΩ (Ing. Kurt 
Zickler GmbH, Pfaffstätten, Austria). Signals were digitized with a 1 kHz sampling rate and 
recorded within a frequency range from DC to 250 Hz. Synchronization of data collection was 
achieved using an external signal generator synchronizing the two DC-amplifiers. 
 
2.6 Data preprocessing 
Eye movement and blink artifacts were first eliminated using a linear regression approach on 
the basis of parameters obtained in pre-experimental calibration trials (Bauer and Lauber, 
1979). Epochs of 1000ms, 800ms following stimulus (offer) onset and 200ms preceding the 
onset, were extracted for the conditions fair/fair, unfair/unfair, fair/unfair, and unfair/fair (see 
Fig.1). For further data processing EEGLAB 6.03b was used (Delorme and Makeig, 2004). The 
800ms epochs were aligned to the 200ms baseline preceding the presentation of the offer. 
Subsequently, data were down-sampled to 250 smp/s, low pass filtered (6dB/octave slope) at 
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30 Hz cutoff, and linear trends were removed. To further improve data quality, e.g. correcting 
for artifacts occurring repeatedly, we followed the approach suggested by Delorme and 
colleagues (2007) which we already used and described in details in Alexopoulos et al. (2012). 
 
2.7 Data analysis 
Based on visual inspection of grand-averaged waveforms,  scalp potential topography of 
difference waves, and in accordance with previous literature, the MFN was quantified as the 
average baseline corrected mean amplitude value in the time range between 220 and 280ms 
after stimulus onset at electrode Fcz, Cz, and Pz (Alexopoulos et al., 2012; Boksem et al., 2012). 
Though, statistical analyses revealed similar results for all electrodes; reported results are based 
on Cz since this electrode gave the highest effect sizes. To reduce confounding effects of other 
ERP components on the amplitude of the MFN and to scrutinize potential differences in 
processing of the outcome for the other recipient, we created difference waves. These 
difference waves were constructed by subtracting ERPs following fair offers from unfair offers 
towards the respective other, while the level of fairness towards oneself was kept constant. This 
way we obtained two difference waves for each player: (1) Self fair, Other unfair minus fair, and 
(2) Self unfair, Other unfair minus fair. Subsequently we extracted the mean amplitude value 
between 220 and 280ms after stimulus onset at electrode Cz.  
Amplitude values of the MFN for the condition human and computer were submitted to 2x2 
repeated measures ANOVAs with the factors Self (levels: fair and unfair share for oneself) and 
Other (levels: fair and unfair share for the other player) separately for both groups of subjects 
(responder and third player). All factors were defined as within-subject factors. To test whether 
difference waves are statistical different from zero a one-sample t-test was applied. To assess 
the relation between early neuronal processes and individual differences in justice sensitivity, 
MFN amplitudes, respectively the associated difference waves (unfair minus fair) at channel Cz 
were correlated with justice sensitivity scores (using Pearson correlation and two-tailed 
significance levels). Due to the low variability in acceptance rates we refrained from correlation 
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analyzes of MFN amplitudes and decision behavior. For all analyses the significance threshold 
was set to p ≤ 0.05. All statistical analyses were carried out with IBM SPSS Statistics 19 software 
(IBM Corp., Armonk, NY, USA). 
 
3 Results 
 
3.1 Performance 
On average responders accepted 53 % (SD = 43.15) of the offers made by the computer, 
compared to 52 % (SD = 43.35) of offers made by human proposers. There was a statistically 
significant difference in acceptance rates depending on which type of offer was received, χ2(3) = 
34.193, P = .000. Post-hoc analysis with Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Tests was conducted with 
Bonferroni correction applied, resulting in a significance level set at p<0.008. Median 
(Interquartile range) acceptance rates for fair/fair, unfair/unfair, unfair/fair and fair/unfair 
offers were 96% (96-100); 0% (0-7), 33% (0-75) and 52% (24-97). Rejection rates were 
significantly higher for inequitable offers compared to equitable offers (for all comparisons 
p<.001). Offers with an unfair share for both players were rejected significantly more often than 
those which represented an unfair share to the dummy-player only.  
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3.2 ERP data  
 
Figure 2| Grand average ERP waveforms for each recipient and proposer at Cz for the offers: fair/fair (blue line), 
unfair/unfair (red line), unfair/fair (black line), or fair/unfair (green line); format: responder/dummy-player. 
Negative is plotted up; Zeros on the timeline indicate the onset of the offer. 
 
3.2.1 Responders 
For the responders, mean MFN amplitudes in the time window 220 to 280ms after a proposal 
given by a human agent revealed no significant main effect for the factor Self, (F(1, 15) = 1.056, 
p=.320, partial η²=.066) and the factor Other (F(1, 15) = 1.644, p=.219, partial η²=.099). 
However, the interaction (Self x Other) was statistically significant (F(1, 15) = 21.159, p=.000, 
partial η²=.585). Grand-average waveforms depicted in Figure 2 clearly show an increased MFN 
following offers with a low share for both recipients (unfair/unfair). Further analyses revealed 
that MFN amplitudes following this kind of offers were statistically significant compared to all 
other possible offers (for all p < 0.04). Likewise, only in cases when the responder received an 
unfair share the amplitudes of difference waves (unfair/unfair minus unfair/fair) were 
significantly different from zero (mean= -2.372μV, t(15)=-4.592, p=.000) (see Fig. 3). In case the 
responder received a fair share, however, no effect for high and low offers assigned to the 
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dummy-player could be found (mean= 1.078μV, t(15)=-1.490, p=.157). The correlation analyzes 
of MFN difference waves and individual differences in justice sensitivity revealed a statistical 
relationship given by perpetrator sensitivity being negatively related to MFN amplitudes 
following proposals comprising unfair amounts towards the dummy-player (r= -.574, p=.025). 
Thus, responders who are concerned about injustice towards others exhibit larger, more 
negative going, MFN amplitudes following advantageous inequality (see Fig. 3).   
 
 
Figure 3| Scalp potential topography of the average voltage differences between fair and unfair offers for the 
other and the two levels of fairness towards oneself for the time point of the MFN (220 - 280ms following offer 
onset). 
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3.2.2 Dummy-player 
Analysis of the mean MFN amplitudes for the dummy-players revealed a significant interaction 
effect for Self x Other, (F(1, 15) = 8.891, p=.009, partial η²=.372) whereas, the factor Self (F(1, 
15) = .006, p =.938, partial η²=.000) and factor Other (F(1, 15) = 4.008, p =.064, partial η²=.211) 
again did not reach significance. Grand-averaged waveforms (see Figure 2) of the dummy-
players indicate that compared to all other possible offers, those offers with a low share for only 
the responders (unfair/fair) are associated with a diminished negative going component. 
Consequently, only in case the dummy-player received a fair share, statistically significant 
differences between unfair and fair offers towards the responder could be observed (mean= 
2.245, t(15)=4.324, p=.001). In case the dummy-player received an unfair amount, no difference 
in MFN amplitudes associated with unfair compared to fair offer towards the responder could 
be observed (mean= -.286μV, t(15)=-.378, p=.710). Scalp distribution further evince that 
differences were largest over the central area and deviate in positive direction (see Fig. 3). The 
relation between justice sensitivity and MFN amplitudes was analyzed similar to the responders’ 
data. Victim sensitivity was positively related to MFN amplitudes following offers with an unfair 
share for the responder, regardless of whether the dummy-player received a fair share (r= .691, 
p=.003) or an unfair share (r=.554, p=.026; see Fig. 4). Accordingly, dummy-players who were 
more concerned about injustice towards themselves exhibited larger positive going MFN 
amplitudes following unfair offers for the responder.  
None of the statistical analyses applied to the ERP data associated with proposals made by the 
computer reached significance – neither for the responders (p>.124) nor for the dummy players 
(p>.391). Furthermore, we found no differences between the responders and the dummy-
players with regard to justice sensitivity (p>.296 for all four scales).  
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Figure 4| Correlation between Justice Sensitivity scores and the difference in MFN amplitude between fair and 
unfair offers towards the respective other each with fair shares for oneself a) MFN differences wave for fair and 
unfair offers towards the dummy-player and perpetrator sensitivity of the responders b) MFN differences wave for 
fair and unfair offers towards the responder and victim sensitivity of the dummy-player 
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4 Discussion 
In contrast to previous studies in the current study two participants were recorded 
simultaneously while playing the three-person UG. Both participants played the part of the 
receivers with those in the role of the dummy-player having no say. The responders, on the 
other side, had veto power and thus, were able to harm the payoff of all other players. These 
differences in power became apparent already about 250ms after the onset of the different 
offers. For both participants a difference in MFN amplitude depending on the share assigned to 
the respective other can be reported. In line with previous literature MFN amplitudes elicited by 
unfair offers were more negative going than those elicited by fair offers, but this only applied 
for the responders. The dummy-players showed to some extend the opposite pattern; unfair 
offers compared to fair offers towards the responder were followed by positive-going 
amplitudes within the time range of the MFN.  
The amplitude of the MFN is associated with the subjective value assigned to a certain situation 
(Holroyd and Coles, 2008; Rigoni et al., 2010); whereas, value is derived by comparative 
processes. Thus, expectations or prior experience and available options change the absolute 
value of a given reward and the associated MFN amplitude. Several studies have shown that 
social processes are also reflected in the amplitude of the MFN (for review see Thoma and 
Bellebaum, 2012). For instance, a recent attempt to investigate MFN amplitude changes in the 
context of the three-person UG found that responders did not differentiate between fair and 
unfair offers assigned to the dummy-player (Alexopoulos et al., 2012). Nevertheless, offers that 
clearly favored the dummy-player opposed to the subjects themselves were followed by the 
most pronounced MFN amplitudes. In contrast, offers that were equally unfair for both – the 
dummy-player and the responder – did not reveal distinct MFN amplitudes. Being speculative, 
anger towards the proposer and envy towards the dummy-player may have led to the increase 
in amplitude. In contrast to the present study these two recipients were anonymous to each 
other. We assume that the change in experimental setup has led to the observed differences in 
the ERP patterns of the responders. In the present study offers with an equally low share for the 
two recipients elicited the most pronounced, negative going, amplitude at the time a MFN is 
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usually observed. This suggests that offers comprising a fair share for at least one of the two 
recipients are evaluated nearly as satisfying as offers with an equally high share for all three 
players. Furthermore, responders clearly differentiated between high and low offers assigned to 
the dummy-player, with low offers leading to a more negative going MFN, at least when they 
themselves received an unfair share as well.  
It is well known that pre-play communication enforces cooperation in social dilemma games or 
bargaining games, respectively (for a survey see Crawford, 1998 or; Greiner et al., 2005 
investigating pre-play communication in the three-person UG). In line with this finding  there 
are at least two explanations for the changes in MFN amplitudes: Strategic issues, since the 
reputation of the responder is at risk, or changes in utility, since group identity enhances “we” 
feelings among group members, commonly summarized as emphatic concerns (Greiner et al., 
2010). Recent efforts in the field of social neuroscience provide evidence that empathy is 
modulated by perceived group membership (Hein et al., 2010) and that empathy-related 
processes are expressed in the appearance of the MFN. Receiving negative feedback is 
associated with an increase in MFN amplitude, observing someone else receiving negative 
feedback similarly elicits a MFN whereas, the magnitude depends on the perceived similarity 
with the other (Carp et al., 2009), the closeness (Kang et al., 2010), self-reported levels of 
empathy (Fukushima and Hiraki, 2009), and the degree to which participants include others in 
their self-concept (Kang, 2010 (Kang et al., 2010). Since the MFN is supposed to be generated in 
the ACC, the fact that the ACC is a key structure implicated in the empathic response to physical 
and social pain of others (Singer et al., 2004; Masten et al., 2011), further suggests that 
empathic concerns over strategic issues have influenced the appearance of the MFN. This view 
is further supported by the relation between justice sensitivity and MFN amplitudes found in 
the present study. 
Even though MFN amplitudes did not differentiate between high and low offers assigned to the 
dummy-player in cases were responders received a high share, the mean amplitude of MFN 
difference waves varied with the degree to which subjects reported to be concerned about 
injustice towards others. Boksem and DeCremer (2010) already reported that MFN amplitudes 
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following unfair offers in the standard UG varied with self-reported concerns for fairness and 
honesty.  
In the present study the degree to which responders included the share for the dummy-player 
when they themselves received a fair share in the evaluation process, similarly varied with their 
concerns for fairness. Responders scoring high on perpetrator sensitivity exhibited larger MFN 
amplitudes following advantageously unequal offers. Perpetrator sensitivity is highly related to 
socially desirable traits as well as to cooperative behavior in social dilemma games (Schmitt et 
al., 2004; Gollwitzer et al., 2005). Since perpetrator sensitivity focuses on situations where 
people actively take advantage of another party, it is assumed to be linked to feelings of guilt 
(Thomas et al., 2010). Hence, discomfort caused by actively contributing to injustice might be 
reflected in higher, more negative-going, MFN amplitudes in response to unfair offers towards 
the dummy-player. In other words, feelings of guilt might reduce the value of the relatively high 
share assigned to the responder in light of a low, unfair share towards the dummy-players.  
However, also MFN amplitudes of the participants playing in the role of the dummy-players 
were related to justice sensitivity though, a somewhat different picture is emerging. First of all 
the dummies´ MFN amplitudes, though differing with respect to the outcome of the responder, 
were more pronounced for fair than unfair offers towards the responder. This is in contrast of 
what one would expect considering the data of the responders. Nevertheless, Marco-Pallares 
and colleagues (2010) showed that in a competitive setting observing someone else receiving a 
gain led to higher, more negative-going MFN amplitudes, whereas in neutral conditions MFN 
amplitudes were higher following losses as compared to gains of the performer. Second, offers 
with low shares for the responder and high shares for the dummy-player elicited a MFN 
difference wave significantly different from zero, but again with positive polarity. Furthermore, 
the higher the scores of the dummy-players were on the victim sensitivity scale, the more 
positive amplitudes following low offers for the responders could be observed. Victim sensitivity 
covers situations associated with injustice towards oneself and is related to socially undesirable 
traits like vengeance, jealousy and distrust. In bargaining games victim sensitive individuals tend 
to be less cooperative, i.e., they offer less in the UG or dictator game. The dummy-players are at 
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a disadvantage from the outset, because they have no influence on the proposed allocation. 
This might have led to the finding that advantageous, unequal offers are more favorable than 
any other possible offer and even more so in subjects who are generally more concerned about 
fairness towards themselves. Furthermore, dummy-players might have anticipated receiving 
lower offers than the responders, therefore high offers for the dummy-player were an 
unexpected reward leading to a reduction in MFN amplitude.  
To conclude, the change in setting clearly affected the way responders processed offers towards 
the powerless third. Contrary to our previous study where the responders reacted mere selfish, 
the presence of the dummy-player seemed to enforce “we” feelings and empathic concerns. 
This was shown by differences in the maximum negative MFN amplitudes. Likewise the 
responders in the anonymous setting, the powerless players exhibited negative social 
preferences. While there are parallels between those two, there are also substantial 
differences: Responders in the anonymous setting preferred all possible offers over those that 
assigned a low share to themselves and a high share towards the other. Therefore, we assumed 
that envy might play a crucial role. In contrast, the powerless players preferred offers with low 
shares towards the responder and high shares towards themselves, which might be more 
closely related to spite.  
In the present study we have shown that the influence of agency and physical distance on social 
preferences can already be observed at an early neural level. Nevertheless, participants were 
unfamiliar to each other prior to the experiment and we did not control for sympathy, future 
research has to show how the level of familiarity or sympathy will further enforce this “we” 
feelings.  
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7 Conclusion and Outlook 
There is comprehensive evidence that humans do not necessarily act in a rational, profit 
maximizing way in strategic social interactions. For instance, they give up money, or even invest 
money to punish others without a recognizable benefit for themselves. This observation has led 
to the awareness that humans do not solely care about their own material payoff, but also 
about the payoff others receive. Nevertheless, since most studies focused on two-person 
strategy games, it is unclear whose payoff people care about. Within the scope of this work, it 
was shown that people do care about the powerless third; however, whether they exhibit 
positive or negative social preferences depends on physical proximity. As indicated by the 
amplitude of the MFN, in a complete anonymous condition responders did not differentiate 
between fair and unfair offers towards the powerless third. Whereas, unfair offers compared to 
fair offers towards themselves were followed by more pronounced MFN amplitudes. When 
players were seated in the same room and EEG was recorded simultaneously, an interaction 
between treatment of oneself and the respective other was found for both participants 
(players). Whereas, responders preferred all offers were at least one of the two received a fair 
amount, dummy-players favored offers where they received more than the responder.  
In the present project only the two extremes, complete anonymity and sitting in the same room 
with previous communication, had been investigated. Nevertheless, it is unclear at what time 
the direction of social preferences changes. In regard to the economic models discussed in 
chapter 2, results related to early neural processing clearly favor the model of Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999) over the ERC model proposed by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). This is supported by the 
observation that at least at an early stage of evaluation responders cared about the payoff of 
each and every other player and not just about whether they received 1/3 of the total amount. 
However, and this holds for both models, inequity aversion may only play a subordinate role 
during early neural processing. Since neither results of the responders nor the dummy-players 
could evidence that humans devalue a reward if it has been unevenly distributed: for instance, 
the dummy-players even favored an advantageous, unequal offer. 
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In paper II we discussed the results of both studies and came to the conclusion that physical 
distance and agency, respectively power, changed the direction of social preferences. 
Nevertheless, there is one important issue that has not been addressed yet. By now, several 
neuroimaging studies have shown that closeness and similarity between players changed the 
degree of empathic concerns. In the present project or particularly in the second study we did 
not control for these variables. However, especially those factors could have a significant 
influence on the direction of social preferences and should be investigated in future studies. 
Besides the social relationship between participating players, personality also plays a crucial role 
in social interactions. Though several studies have shown that demographic variables, 
intellectual abilities, and socio-economic status do not modulate behavior in this game (Güth et 
al., 2007; Nguyen et al., 2011), there is strong variability in behavior related to state affect, 
personality characteristics and attachment behavior. For instance individuals with higher levels 
of cognitive control are less likely to reject unfair offers (De Neys et al., 2011). Similarly, 
anxiously attached individuals (Almakias and Weiss, 2012) and suffering responders increase 
their acceptance rate (Mancini et al., 2011). On the other hand, individuals with high levels of 
self-esteem are supposed to demand more and hence, reject low offers more frequently (Dunn 
et al., 2010). Impulsiveness and anger are further factors leading to higher rejection rates in the 
ultimatum game (Pillutla and Murnighan, 1996; Crockett et al., 2010). Anger and contempt are 
supposed to underlie irrational decision making whereas higher levels of trust and the belief in 
good intentions of others lead to more rational behavior (Nguyen et al., 2011). Scheres and 
Sanfey (2006) used the Behavioral Activation System (BAS) to look for individual differences in 
the ultimatum game. The BAS consists of three scales: (1) Reward responsiveness, measuring 
positive responses to the occurrence of reward, (2) drive, measuring the persistent pursuit of a 
desired goal and (3) fun seeking. They found that higher scores in the drive scale corresponded 
to higher offers in the ultimatum game, lower offers in the dictator game, and a larger 
discrepancy between the offers in the two games. Additionally, high scores in the reward 
responsiveness scale corresponded to lower offers in the dictator game and a larger discrepancy 
between the two games. For the fun seeking scale they found no significant correlation. The 
authors assume that individuals with high scores in the reward responsiveness scale and the 
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drive scale use a certain strategy in these games. They first seek to maximize the likelihood of 
reward and in the next step seek to maximize the size of the reward.  
Though, or perhaps because, results are very diverging, personality could as well determine 
whether a person exhibits positive or negative social preferences and should be assessed in 
future studies. 
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Economics games 
Dictator Game 
The Dictator Game is the simplest two-person game capturing 
real altruism. In this game a person A is endowed with a 
certain amount of money, which he/she has to share with 
person B. Person B has to accept any amount offered, thus 
has no power in this game. Assuming that individuals are 
selfish individuals B should get nothing. 
 
Ultimatum Game 
The Ultimatum Game is an extended version of the 
Dictator Game. However, in contrast to the Dictator 
Game, the Responder, respectively the Player B, can 
decide whether he accepts or rejects the proposed 
division. In case he accepts the money is allocated 
accordingly, otherwise, if rejected both receive 
nothing. Similar to the Dictator Game A should send 
the lowest possible amount to B and B should accept every amount offered. 
 
Third-Party Punishment Game 
In the Third-Party Punishment Game, there are three players, A, B, and C. Player A is endowed 
with a sum of money and has to decide how much to give to player B, the dummy-player, who 
has no endowment. Up to this point it is similar to the Dictator Game.  
 - 111 - 
 
The third player C, who is endowed with a smaller sum of money, observes this allocation and 
has the possibility to spend some money to punish player A. Due to the fact that punishment is 
costly, without punishing player C gets a fair share.  A selfish player C would never punish 
because punishment is costly, therefore the third-party punishment game captures altruistic 
punishment. 
 
Trust Game 
In the two-person Trust Game either each player or only the investor is endowed with a certain 
amount of money. Player A, the investor, can send money to player B, the trustee. The money A 
sends to B is then quadrupled by the investigator. Now B can decide how much of the 
quadrupled money he would like to send back to A. Game theory predicts that B sends nothing 
back to A and thus, A should in a first step keep all the money. 
 
Prisoners` Dilemma Game 
In the Prisoners` Dilemma Game two players choose simultaneously between the two 
strategies: defect (D) or cooperate (C). If a player chooses C, he can either receive a reward (R), 
if the other player chooses C as well. Otherwise if the other player chooses D, he receives the so 
called sucker´s payoff (S). If both players choose D, they receive the punishment (P). A player 
using D receives payoff T (temptation) if the other player cooperates or P if the other defects. 
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The ranking of the payoff – T>R>P>S – is essential for a prisoners` dilemma game. Since, T>R and 
P>S the best strategy would be to defect. 
 
 
 
Public Good Game 
The Game can be performed with any number of players, who are endowed with a certain 
amount of money they can contribute to a joint project. Thus, each player has to decide how 
much money he/she would like to spend or how much money he/she would like to keep. None 
of the players is forced to contribute. Nevertheless, the “public good” will be, e.g., doubled by 
the investigator and all players profit equally irrespective of what they spent.  
 
 
  
 - 113 - 
 
 
  
 - 114 - 
 
Instruction (Proposer) 
Instruktion: Ultimatum-Spiel 
 
Du nimmst nun an einem Experiment teil dessen Ziel es ist, das Entscheiden in 
gewinnorientierten Situationen zu erfassen.  
 
Die Spielregeln 
In diesem Spiel gibt es drei Personen (X, Y und Z) und einen Geldbetrag von 12 € bzw. 15 €. 
Spieler  X entscheidet wie er diesen Geldbetrag untereinander aufteilen möchte. Danach kann 
Spieler Y entscheiden ob er dieses Angebot annimmt oder ablehnt. Nimmt Y das Angebot an, 
erhält jeder Spieler den von X angebotenen Anteil des Geldbetrages. Lehnt Y das Angebot von X 
ab, gehen alle Spieler leer aus. Der dritte Spieler Z hat keinen Einfluss auf den Spielverlauf, muss 
jedoch bei der Verteilung berücksichtigt werden. 
 
Du bist Spieler X. Auf dem Antwortblatt findest du 20 vorgefertigte Verteilungen. Wähle für die 
beiden Beträge (12 und 15 €) je einen Verteilung aus, die du den beiden anderen Spielern (Y und 
Z) anbieten möchtest.  
Anschließend werden 40 verschiedenen Personen in der Rolle von Y bzw. Z dein Foto und dein 
Angebot vorgelegt, und Y entscheidet, ob er diese Angebote annimmt oder ablehnt.  
 
Gewinn 
Dein Gewinn ergibt sich aus der Summe der angenommenen Angebote. Jener Spieler, welcher 
den höchsten Gewinn erzielt erhält 20 €. 
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Entscheidung 1 Entscheidung 2 
Angebot in der 
Rolle von X 
 
 
Verteilung von 12 € an X, 
Y, und Z 
Angebot in der 
Rolle von X 
 
 
Verteilung von 15 € an X, Y, 
und Z 
 X Y Z  X Y Z 
 4 2 6  5 2 8 
 4 6 2  5 8 2 
 4 4 4  5 5 5 
 4 1 7  6 2 7 
 4 7 1  6 7 2 
 10 1 1  13 1 1 
Name: Alter: E-mail: 
  
 - 116 - 
 
Instructions (Responder) 
Instruktion: Ultimatum-Spiel 
 
 
In diesem Spiel gibt es drei Spieler (Anbieter, Spieler 1 und Spieler 2) und einen Geldbetrag von 
12, 15 oder 18 €. Der Anbieter entscheidet wie er diesen Geldbetrag untereinander aufteilen 
möchte. Danach kann Spieler 1 entscheiden, ob er dieses Angebot annimmt oder ablehnt. 
Nimmt jener das Angebot an, erhält jeder Spieler den vom Anbieter angebotenen Anteil des 
Geldbetrages. Lehnt er das Angebot ab, gehen alle Spieler leer aus. Spieler 2 hat keinen Einfluss 
auf den Spielverlauf, muss jedoch bei der Verteilung berücksichtigt werden. 
Im Vorfeld dieses Experiments haben 81 Personen jeweils zwei Angebote mit unterschiedlichen 
Beträgen (12, 15, oder 18 €) abgegeben. Zu Beginn eines Blockes siehst du Fotos der Anbieter, 
danach folgen die Angebote. Nach jedem Angebot erscheinen am unteren Teil des Bildschirmes 
zwei Kästchen mit den Antwortmöglichkeiten „annehmen“ oder „ablehnen“. In welchem der 
beiden Kästchen die jeweilige Antwortmöglichkeit steht variiert während dem Experiment. 
Solltest du jene Antwortmöglichkeit wählen die rechts am Bildschirm steht drücke bitte die 
rechte Taste. Solltest du jene Antwortmöglichkeit wählen die links am Bildschirm steht drücke 
bitte die linke Taste. Nach dem Tastendruck erscheint die Rückmeldung über die tatsächliche 
Aufteilung und ein neuer Durchgang beginnt. Du siehst wieder die Fotos der Anbieter für den 
folgenden Block. 
Spieler 2 sieht während des gesamten Experiments auf seinem Bildschirm dasselbe wie Spieler 
1. Nach manchen Angeboten erscheint eine Frage, diese ist von Spieler 2 zu beantworten. Für 
jede richtige Antwort gibt es zusätzlich 0,50 €. 
Bezahlung: Die Summe des Gewinnes der Anbieter wird über alle Versuchspersonen errechnet, 
wobei nur jene 5 Anbieter Geld gewinnen können, die den höchsten Gewinn erzielten. Für alle 
drei Spieler gilt, dass nicht alle sondern 4 zufällig ausgewählte Durchgänge bezahlt werden. 
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Abstract 
Emotions play a crucial role in the decision making process. Usually the interplay between 
emotional and social factors and their impact on decision making is studied using two-person 
bargaining games like the ultimatum game. Nevertheless, in real life decisions are hardly made 
in an uncoupled dyad, instead there are others influencing our decisions either by their mere 
presence or because decisions bear consequences for them too. One major problem in 
understanding the decision making processes in games with more than two players is that it is 
still unclear who the relevant players are, or under what circumstances others influence our 
decision making process. 
Studies investigating the standard ultimatum game have shown that unfair compared to fair 
offers are accompanied by a negative-going deflection in the ongoing electroencephalogram 
(EGG) with peak activation about 250ms after the onset of the offer. It is assumed that this 
component, termed the medial frontal negativity (MFN), reflects the subjective value of a given 
reward or punishment. The aim of the project at hand was to investigate how the amount of 
money the other player receives, the physical proximity between players, and the power of 
players affect the processing of the different kinds of offers or the subjective value of offers as 
indicated by MFN amplitudes. 
In order to address this issue systematically two studies were conducted. Both studies used the 
three-person ultimatum game and EEG as a method. During the experiment offers about how to 
split up a certain amount of money between the players of the game (proposer, responder and 
dummy-player), were presented to the recipients (responder and dummy-player). Offers made 
by the so-called proposers were collected prior to the EEG experiment. Following the 
presentation of the offer the responder had the possibility to accept or reject the offer. In case 
the offer was accepted, money was allocated as proposed. Otherwise, if rejected, none of the 
players received any money in this round. The third person, respectively the dummy-player, had 
no direct bearing on the game. 
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In the first study players were anonymous to each other. EEG was recorded from participants 
playing in the role of the responder. The presence of the dummy-player was simulated. It was 
given the impression that the dummy-player is a real person, who’s EEG, however, is recorded 
in another EEG chamber. In the second study the very same paradigm was applied, however, 
the EEG of the responder and the dummy-player was recorded simultaneously, while sitting in 
the same room. This way it was possible to investigate the influence of agency on the processing 
of fair and unfair treatment of oneself and the respective other. 
As indicated by the amplitude of the MFN, in the complete anonymous condition responders did 
not differentiate between fair and unfair offers towards the powerless third. Whereas, unfair 
offers compared to fair offers towards themselves were followed by more pronounced MFN 
amplitudes. Interestingly, offers comprising an unfair amount to the responder himself and a 
high or fair amount to the dummy-player were followed by the most pronounced amplitude and 
thus, one might assume that those offers were least preferable. Furthermore, we found a 
relation between MFN amplitudes and rejection rate of unfair offers. In the second experiment, 
a somewhat different picture emerges. An interaction between treatment of oneself and the 
respective other was found for both participants (players). Whereas, responders preferred all 
offers were at least one of the two received a fair amount, dummy-players favored offers where 
they received more than the responder. MFN amplitudes in both groups of subjects were 
correlated with the reported levels of justice sensitivity. Taken together, results indicated that 
fair and unfair treatment of someone else changes the way humans evaluate how they are 
being treated themselves. However, physical proximity and agency are two important 
determinates that account for alterations in processing. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Gefühle spielen eine zentrale Rolle bei der Entscheidungsfindung. Bei der Untersuchung des 
Zusammenspiels von emotionalen und sozialen Faktoren und deren Einfluss auf unsere 
Entscheidungen macht man sich in der Regel Zwei-Personen-Spiele, wie das Ultimatum-Spiel, zu 
Nutze. Dennoch werden in der Realität selten Entscheidung innerhalb einer entkoppelten Dyade 
gemacht, stattdessen sind oft auch andere beteiligt, die unsere Entscheidungen beeinflussen, 
entweder durch ihre bloße Anwesenheit oder weil Entscheidungen auch Folgen für sie mit sich 
bringen. Ein großes Problem beim Verständnis der Entscheidungsprozesse in Spielen mit mehr 
als zwei Spielern ist, dass unklar ist, wer die relevanten Akteure sind oder unter welchen 
Umständen andere die Entscheidungsfindung beeinflussen. 
In vorangegangenen Arbeiten zum Zwei-Personen-Ultimatum-Spiel konnte gezeigt werden, dass 
unfaire Angebote im Gegensatz zu fairen Angeboten von einer negativ verlaufenden Ablenkung 
im Elektroenzephalogramm (EGG) mit einem Amplitudenmaximum bei 250 ms nach der 
Präsentation des Angebots begleitet werden. Es wird davon ausgegangen, dass diese 
Komponente, die sogenannte mediale frontale Negativität (MFN), den subjektiven Wert einer 
bestimmten Belohnung oder Bestrafung widerspiegelt. Ziel des vorliegenden Projektes war es zu 
untersuchen, in wie weit sich unfaire Angebote an einen unbeteiligten Dritten, auf die 
Ausprägung der MFN auswirken; abhängig von der räumliche Nähe zwischen den Spielern und 
der Macht der einzelnen Spieler. 
Um dieser Frage systematisch nachzugehen wurden zwei Studien durchgeführt. In beiden 
Studien wurde im Gegensatz zu den bisherigen Studien das Drei-Personen-Ultimatum-Spiel 
verwendet. Während des Experiments wurden den Teilnehmern Angebote präsentiert, d.h. 
Vorschläge wie man einen bestimmten Betrag zwischen den Spieler (Anbieter, Antwortender 
und Dummy) aufteilen sollte. Die Angebote wurden von den sogenannten Anbietern gemacht 
und vor dem eigentlichen Experiment erhoben. Nach der Präsentation des Angebotes hatte der 
Antwortende die Möglichkeit das Angebot abzulehnen oder anzunehmen. Im Fall, dass das 
Angebot angenommen wurde, wurde das Geld wie vorgeschlagen verteilt, andern Falls, bei 
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einer Ablehnung erhielt keiner der Spieler Geld in dieser Runde. Die dritte Person bzw. der 
Dummy-Spieler hatte keinen direkten Einfluss auf das Spiel. 
In der ersten Studie waren die Spieler anonym zueinander. Die Teilnehmer, deren EEG 
aufgezeichnet wurde, spielten in der Rolle des Antwortenden (Responder), die Anwesenheit des 
Dummy wurde simuliert. Es wurde der Eindruck vermittelt, dass der Dummy-Spieler eine reale 
Person ist, dessen EEG ebenfalls, jedoch in einer anderen EEG-Kammer aufgezeichnet wird. In 
der zweiten Studie kam dasselbe Paradigma zur Anwendung, jedoch wurde das EEG des 
Antwortenden und des Dummys simultan aufgezeichnet, während sie im selben Raum saßen. 
Auf diese Weise war es möglich, den Einfluss der Möglichkeit zu Handeln auf die Verarbeitung 
von fairem und unfairem Verhalten gegenüber einem selbst und gegenüber dem jeweils 
anderen zu untersuchen.   
Wie durch die Amplitude der MFN angezeigt, unterschieden die Antwortenden nicht zwischen 
fairen und unfairen Angeboten gegenüber dem machtlosen Dritten. Unfaire Angebote im 
Vergleich zu fairen Angeboten für einen selbst wurden von stärker ausgeprägten MFN 
Amplituden gefolgt. Interessanterweise zeigte sich, dass ein unfairer Betrag für den 
Antwortenden selbst, bei einem gleichzeitig hohen oder fairen Betrag für den Dummy-Spieler, 
mit der am höchsten ausgeprägten MFN Amplitude einhergeht und man davon ausgehen kann, 
dass jene Angebote von den Antwortenden am wenigsten favorisiert wurden. Darüber hinaus 
fanden wir einen Zusammenhang zwischen der Amplitude der MFN und den Ablehnungsraten 
eines unfairen Angebotes. Im zweiten Experiment fand sich eine Wechselwirkung in Bezug auf 
die unterschiedlichen experimentellen Manipulationen. Während die Antwortenden jedes 
Angebot bevorzugten in dem mindestens einer der beiden einen fairen Betrag erhalten hatte, 
favorisierten die Dummy-Spieler jene Angebote in denen sie mehr als die Antwortenden 
erhielten. Die Amplitude der MFN korrelierte in beiden Gruppen mit der angegebenen 
Sensitivität für Gerechtigkeit. Zusammengenommen zeigen die Ergebnisse, dass faires/unfaires 
Verhalten gegenüber einem anderen die Art und Weise verändern, wie Menschen die 
Behandlung von sich selbst bewerten. Körperliche Nähe und die Handlungsmöglichkeiten sind 
dabei zwei wesentliche Determinanten, die diese Prozesse beeinflussen. 
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Presentation of the project 
Next to the two publications presented in chapter 5 and 6, parts of this project were presented 
at international conferences, symposia, or summer schools: 
Poster presentations and Abstracts: 
1. 49th Annual Meeting of the Society for Psychophysiological Research, October 21-24, 
2009, Berlin, Germany. 
 
2. International Symposium on the Neural Basis of Decision Making, April 20-22, 2009, De 
Poort, Groesbeek, the Netherlands. 
 
3. “Junge Forschende im Dialog” Posteraustellung an der Fakultät für Psychologie, July 02, 
2010, Vienna, Austria. 
 
Oral Presentations: 
1. Akademie der Wissenschaft, January 23th  , 2009, Vienna, Austria 
 
2. Mei:CogSci Student Conference, June 20th , 2009, Bratislava, Slovakia 
 
3. Cognitive, Affective, and Nociceptive Functioning of the Anterior Cingulate Cortex, 
November 25-28, 2010, Oppurg, Germany 
 
4. Mind, Brain Imaging, and Neuroethics Research Unit , University of Ottawa, Institute of 
Mental Health Research,  October 19th , 2011, Ottawa, Canada 
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